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Management as the sine qua non for M&A success 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper studies the quality of management of acquiring firms as an important determinant of 
merger and acquisition (M&A) success. We model management practices as an unobserved 
(latent) variable in a standard microeconomic model of the firm and derive firm-year 
management estimates therefrom. We show that our measure is the most important determinant 
of value creation in M&A deals: a one-standard-deviation increase in the measure almost 
doubles cumulative abnormal returns. Our results are robust to the inclusion of acquirer fixed 
effects, to a large set of control variables, and to several other sensitivity tests.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Despite the voluminous literature on merger and acquisition (M&A) success, the main source of 
that success remains an issue of debate. Most of the variables that researchers propose as 
determinants of acquirers’ performance add little explanatory power to models of value creation. 
The main reason is that M&A success relies on variables that, by their own nature, relate to the 
acquirer’s management practices (Golubov et al., 2015), which are either entirely unobserved to 
researchers or difficult to measure. In this study, we examine the role of management practices in 
M&A value creation. We show that broadly defined and measured management practices are the 
most important determinant (the sine qua non) of takeover success. 
 The broad definition of “management practices” includes all business decisions and 
leadership elements. According to mainstream management theory (Katz, 1974), there are three 
components of management: human resource management (the ability to interact, communicate, 
motivate, and negotiate), technical abilities (human capital, knowledge, and proficiency), and 
conceptual skills (understanding concepts, develop ideas, and implement strategies). We use the 
term “management practices,” as this is the most general term encompassing human resource 
management, technical abilities, and conceptual skills. Economics textbooks often call the 
concept entrepreneurship, and some management and accounting textbooks describe it as 
average skill or ability of executives and managers. Although the extant literature on M&As has 
been growing steadily over the years, the study of management practices has remained a niche 
field—most probably a result of the difficulty to measure managerial skills, —thus constituting 
an important omitted variable. 
To measure management practices as broadly defined, we use the implications of recent 
literature, which suggests that management practices are indispensable in defining production 
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relations. Specifically, Bloom et al. (2017) build on early models of management by Lucas 
(1978) and Melitz (2003) and show that besides capital (defined to include physical capital, 
financial capital, R&D expenses, and land) and labor, firms choose management practices to 
achieve their objectives. This assumption is perfectly aligned with the idea that there are three 
(instead of two) inputs of production and that management (or entrepreneurship) complements 
capital and labor (e.g., Samuelson and Nordhaus, 2009). Importantly, Bloom et al. (2017) use a 
state-of-the-art index of management practices, composed using their World Management 
Survey (WMS), and show that firms optimally choose their executives and managers to utilize 
their talents, skills, and overall competences to improve productivity and value. Thus, the WMS 
measure is fully in line with the broad definition of management, including human resources, 
technical, and conceptual skills. Unfortunately, this measure is available for a relatively small 
number of firms.  
Following this set of theoretical models and empirical work, Delis and Tsionas (2018) 
estimate management practices using a theoretical model very similar to that of Bloom et al. 
(2017), in which management is the only unobserved (latent) input of production. Their model is 
estimated for any firm for which accounting measures of inputs/outputs are observed, whereas 
latent management can be estimated at the firm-year level by priors in Bayesian techniques. To 
validate their approach and show that management does not capture any other unobserved input 
of production, Delis and Tsionas compare their management estimates to the WMS measure and 
show that the two measures correlate by more than 90%. They also validate their approach out of 
sample using a Monte Carlo approach. 
We also resort to using a latent variable model to measure management, as it is the only 
one available that has three important features. First, it can be used for all firms (acquirers) to 
3 
 
yield a firm-year index and not just the ones in the WMS. Second, it is consistent with both the 
theoretical economic models of management and the broad definition in the management 
literature. Third, it can be validated against the WMS or via econometric methods to avoid 
attributing the estimates to other unobserved inputs. We indeed validate our approach and show 
that it is a robust measure of management practices. 
 Subsequently, our main contribution is to identify the effect of the acquirers’ 
management practices on the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) in M&A deals. We posit that 
management must be among the most important CAR determinants, given the unique ability of 
good management to identify prosperous M&A deals and realize them in the most efficient way 
possible. Thus, our baseline specification follows from the extant literature on CAR modeling 
around M&As (e.g., Bao and Edmans, 2011; Golubov et al., 2015), with the exception that we 
add our management index. 
The results of our study indicate that management practices are economically the most 
significant explanatory variable of CARs. Specifically, a one-standard-deviation increase in our 
measure more than doubles the CAR of the average M&A deal. Also, incorporating management 
practices more than doubles the model’s power: the adjusted R-squared increases from 4.3% in 
the model without management to 9.1% in the model with management. 
 Importantly, our results are still potent when including acquirer fixed effects in our 
general sample or in samples of repeated (frequent or occasional) acquirers. Similar to the 
picture provided by the WMS, our findings suggest that management practices are not merely a 
firm fixed effect. They are time-variant, implying that the dynamics of employment (entry and 
exit of employees), the learning process, and depreciation of human capital are important in 
defining M&A success.  
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 Our baseline results survive across a large battery of sensitivity tests. Specifically, we 
first use a long list of explanatory variables that the accounting and finance literatures identify as 
significant determinants of CARs, including corporate governance indicators, characteristics of 
top executives, and firm performance indicators. Second, we control for industry characteristics 
(e.g., high-tech firms, R&D expenses, etc.) for the acquirer, the target, or both. Third, we use 
alternative time windows to construct CARs and remove outliers by winsorizing our data. 
Fourth, we look at the role of managerial practices in synergistic gains (measured through 
synergy CARs). In all these specifications, management is the most important determinant of 
CARs, second only to acquirer’s size in the specifications with fixed effects. 
There are three interrelated contributions of our paper. First and foremost, we show that 
management, when broadly measured, is among the most important determinants of M&A 
success, essentially doubling the power of CAR models. Recent literature, especially Golubov et 
al. (2015), alludes to the idea, as in standard M&A event studies, the inclusion of acquirer fixed 
effects markedly increases CAR models’ explanatory power. With our management index we 
explain part of this fixed effect, but also reflect the importance of within-firm variations in 
management practices, as the effect on M&A success comes over and above acquirer fixed 
effects. 
Second, we introduce to the relevant corporate finance literature (e.g., McDonald et al., 
2008; Custódio et al., 2013; Jaffe et al., 2013) a thorough measure of management that originates 
in standard microeconomic theory. We eclectically view this measure as a complement (not a 
substitute) to governance characteristics such as executive compensation and CEO experience, 
which can then be more precise in what they aim to measure. 
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Third, we bring together four well-established but distinct strands of literature in 
accounting, corporate finance, management, and production economics. An important 
accounting literature aims to disentangle the effects of the quality of financial reporting from the 
efficient management of firms when examining M&A success or other firm outcomes (e.g., Dyer 
et al., 2016; references therein). The relevant corporate finance literature examines the driving 
forces behind M&A success and explains a limited part of the variability in abnormal returns 
(e.g., Moeler et al., 2004; Masulis et al., 2007; Hartford et al., 2012; Golubov et al., 2015). The 
relevant management literature brings in the theoretical ideas of dynamic manager capabilities 
(e.g., Kor and Mesko, 2013) and overall effects on performance (e.g., Huselid, 1995). The 
relevant production economics literature highlights important aspects of empirically estimating 
production functions (e.g., Greene, 2008; Ackerberg et al., 2006). The merger of these three 
literatures allows us to explain a significant part of M&A success and opens up new pathways 
for exploring important aspects of financial management, both within the borders of a country, 
but also in the international arena.   
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 defines management practices, 
briefly discusses existing measures, and provides the model and estimation for our measure. 
Section 3 discusses the sample of M&As and estimation of CARs. Section 4 provides the 
empirical analysis of management practices in the CAR model. Section 5 concludes and provides 
directions for future research.  
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2. Management practices: Definition, theory, and measurement 
 
2.1.  A broad definition of management practices 
  
Management’s role in value creation, governance, board structure, and CEO compensation is a 
vivid avenue for academic research in accounting, finance, and management sciences (e.g., 
Harris and Holmstrom, 1982; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Silva, 2010). Here we define 
management practices in the broadest way possible. Our definition includes three main 
interrelated dimensions that originate in Katz (1974) and have become benchmarks in 
management literature. 
The first relates to human resource management, which encapsulates the abilities to lead, 
interact, communicate, motivate, and negotiate. These abilities are fundamental for managing 
employees of acquirers and targets, motivating them, providing a new vision after an acquisition, 
and successfully negotiating M&A deals at the highest level of detail. Technical abilities relate to 
human capital, depth of knowledge, and proficiency among CEOs, top executives, and managers. 
Technical skill implies, inter alia, proficiency in all aspects of firm value creation, including 
M&A deals or choices regarding those aiding in completing these deals. Third, conceptual skills 
include understanding concepts, developing new ideas, and implementing strategies. This 
involves seeing the enterprise as a whole, improving efficiency (the optimal use of inputs), and 
understanding a firm’s relationship with industry, political, social, and economic forces. 
Managers, top executives, and CEOs differ markedly in these practices within firms and 
across time.1 There are two main reasons for this. First, management is a learning-by-doing 
process, and good management implies fast learning and adaptation to emerging challenges in 
quickly changing environments. Second, decision-making teams evolve frequently; new 
                                                 
1 For international studies of M&As differences would also include cultural components between acquirer and target 
companies (Morosini et al., 1998; Björkman et al., 2007). 
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members join the team and others leave. Accordingly, this shapes the skills across the three main 
dimensions of management.    
 
2.2. Previous measures of management and recent theory 
 
A number of past articles has attempted to capture managerial quality based on a firm’s 
economic outcomes after CEO departure. For example, Hayes and Schaefer (1999) argue that 
good managers are those individuals whose former firm experienced a negative shock after their 
leave. Likewise, Bamber et al. (2010) show that managerial skill might affect a firm’s accounting 
and disclosure plans, which can alter earnings and planning with several consequences for the 
firm’s future—the way a CEO manages a company might have long-lasting effects, even after 
her departure. In addition, managerial skill differentials and styles are also observed to 
individuals below the CEO level, such as the CFO (Ge et al., 2011). Finally, an important aspect 
when studying managerial skill is its multidimensional profile. For example, Kaplan et al. (2012) 
identify two components of managerial practices: general ability and execution skills (e.g., 
communication and interpersonal skills) and find that CEOs with higher general ability and 
execution skills are better at increasing firm value. 
In M&As, where the allocation of resources is considerable, and the risk of heavy losses 
is high (Hartford and Li, 2007; Moeller et al., 2005), we expect management practices to play a 
crucial role in creating value for acquirers. However, the literature considers only how distinct 
elements of management affect M&A success. 
Most closely related to our research objectives, for example, is the work on CEO 
experience in M&A deals. Jaffe et al. (2013) document that CEOs who were successful in their 
last deals tend to have higher-performing subsequent acquisitions. Custódio and Metzger (2013) 
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and McDonald et al. (2008) find that CEOs who have experience in M&As for specific industries 
are more likely to increase corporate value. This expertise could provide management teams with 
better information and superior bargaining power, all of which having positive effects for 
acquiring firms. Hayward (2002) provides similar results from the whole firms’ (as opposed to 
CEO) perspective. However, CEO experience and other corporate governance characteristics do 
not capture all good management practices.2 
Several strands of literature attempt to proxy for management practices via firm size, 
performance indicators, and firm fixed effects. However, performance indicators tend to assume 
everything is the result of managerial skill; clearly this is not the case, because numerous firm 
characteristics and operational processes are outside the managers’ reach. Similarly, fixed effects 
tend to assume all time-invariant firm characteristics are management-related, which again is not 
the case because, inter alia, management practices are not stable over time (Bloom et al., 2017).  
Recent techniques also include frontier-efficiency methods (e.g., data envelopment 
analysis, or DEA) and assume that skill is defined as efficiency if one subtracts variables outside 
the reach of executives and managers, such as firm size and age, market share, ownership status, 
etc. (e.g., Demerjian et al., 2012). Delis and Tsionas (2018) suggest that there are two problems 
with this approach. The first is that, especially when using DEA, regressing efficiency scores on 
covariates results in econometric bias and inconsistency (Simar and Wilson, 2007). The second 
problem is that the variables used in the second stage never completely capture all firm elements 
that are beyond managerial control (much like performance indicators). This naturally creates 
                                                 
2 Advisors could also affect M&A outcomes. For example, Bao and Edmans (2011) find a positive relationship 
between M&A outcomes and advices received by advisors from U.S. banks. However, this is not the case for cross-
border acquisitions, as documented by Rajamani et al. (2016), who find that the employment of internationally 
diversified advisors decreases M&A returns. A reason for this could be that international advisors have less to lose 
compared to domestic ones. 
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omitted-variable bias in the residuals, which then include other elements of efficiency besides 
those that managers control. 
The state-of-the-art way to measure management practices is suggested by Bloom and 
Van Reenen (2007; 2010) and later studies by the same team. They use survey data (the World 
Management Survey, or WMS) for a limited number of firms worldwide to quantify best 
management practices that cover a full spectrum of managerial processes and explain how those 
processes affect productivity. In doing so, they report data on the usual firm inputs (capital and 
labor) and output (sales), along with a robust measure of managerial processes (what they call 
"management practices"). This approach is state-of-the-art because of the survey detail and the 
thorough illustration of different managerial operations and processes.3 
Bloom et al. (2017) justify their approach theoretically using a model similar to Lucas 
(1978). Their model includes management in the firm’s production function as an input, which is 
separate from capital, labor, and a production efficiency component. The distinguishing feature 
of their model is that management is determined endogenously to its autoregressive component 
and investment in management. The authors show that this model produces qualitatively similar 
results and inferences on the role of management in firm performance with those of the WMS-
based measure. 
Delis and Tsionas (2018) use the theoretical implications of Bloom et al. (2017) to 
estimate management for all firms for which inputs (capital and number of employees) and 
output (sales) are available. Their empirical model assumes a cost function of the firm in which 
                                                 
3 Bloom and Van Reenen (2007), taking all the necessary steps to get accurate (free of measurement error) data, use 
an evaluation tool designed by a consultancy firm (McKinsey) that is composed of 18 management practices (e.g., 
performance tracking, or managing human capita, inter alia). In addition, using an econometric model of 
productivity they validate their managerial practices data following a two-step approach, where the production 
function is estimated in the first stage, and total factor productivity (TFP) is calculated in the second stage. WMS 
can be retrieved from the following link: http://worldmanagementsurvey.org/survey-data/download-data/ 
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management is an unobserved (latent) input of production. Subsequently, they approximate 
latent management from its latent dynamics and observed firm characteristics, such as firm size 
and input prices (as proxies of investment in management). Importantly, Delis and Tsionas 
validate their model against alternative interpretations of their latent variable by (i) showing that 
when applied to the WMS data their measure approximates the management practices measure in 
Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) by more than 90%,4 and (ii) using restrictive Monte Carlo 
simulations on a theoretical model similar to that of Bloom et al. (2017). 
 
2.3. Measuring management 
 
Given the above, we measure management by resorting to a version of Delis and Tsionas (2018) 
because this is the only measure sharing three key features. First, we can estimate management 
for all firms involved in M&A deals and not just the ones in the WMS. Second, management 
viewed as an input of the production process is consistent with both the theoretical economic 
models of management (Lucas, 1978; Bloom et al., 2017) and the broad definition in the 
management literature (Katz, 1974; many others henceforth). Third, we can validate our 
approach against the WMS or via Monte Carlo methods to avoid attributing our management 
estimates to other unobserved inputs. 
We assume that management practices constitute an unobserved (latent) input of 
production, along with labor and capital, the latter being defined to include physical capital, 
financial capital, R&D expenses, and land. This is a key assumption, implying that the only 
                                                 
4 They use a total of 6,049 observations to estimate managerial practices from the WMS database. For robustness 
purposes, they also split the sample into four subsamples based in one of the following countries: France, Germany, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States. Their results are robust in all cases indicating that their measure of 
management practices highly predicts the values of Bloom and Van Reenen (2007). 
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unobserved input is management. We back up this “solitude assumption” both theoretically and 
empirically. 
From a theoretical viewpoint, all modern textbooks list human capital, entrepreneurship, 
or a similar notion as that third factor (e.g., Samuelson and Nordhaus, 2009), and this completes 
the list. Bloom et al. (2017) explicitly model management as that third factor of production 
(again this completes the list) and show that their model consistently explains productivity and 
performance differences between firms. The fields of corporate governance and management 
science largely evolve around the idea that coordinating inputs requires human resource 
management, technical, and conceptual skills in order to gather, allocate, and distribute economic 
resources or consumer products to individuals and other businesses. However, and in stark 
contrast, “best management practices” are then missing from the list of inputs in the estimation 
of production relations. 
From an empirical viewpoint, this assumption is in fact testable as in Delis and Tsionas 
(2018). We follow this paradigm and validate our management measure in two ways. The first 
involves estimating our model using data on inputs and outputs from WMS and comparing our 
management estimates with the WMS management scores. The second is via a Monte Carlo 
method on a stochastic frontier model. This model creates an environment unfavorable to our 
approach because it assumes management to be part of the inefficiency component (as e.g. in 
Demerjian et al., 2012). We conduct this analysis in the Appendix and show that our model 
produces estimates more than 90% correlated with the WMS measure or the simulated estimates 
from the Monte Carlo.5 
                                                 
5 The equivalent correlations between management measures derived from frontier efficiency models and the WMS 
or the simulated scores never exceed 30%. 
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Instead of using a cost function as in Delis and Tsionas (2018), we prefer to model a 
production function for two reasons related to simplicity and replicability. First, management 
directly enters the production function as a latent input. In contrast, cost and profit equations are 
functions of input prices (and not input quantities), which imply involved transformations 
including the share equations to estimate management practices. Second, estimation of the 
production function implies that we do not need data on management compensation (i.e., the 
price of management quality), which in principle had to be another latent variable in the model. 
This increases the estimation complexity, potentially introducing further bias in our estimates. 
The production function takes the form: 
 𝑞𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡) + 𝑢𝑖𝑡         (1) 
where q represents the output of firm i in year t and 𝑥 is the vector of inputs, including 
management (m). For the estimation, we use a translog specification, which has the appealing 
properties of flexibility and linearity in the parameters, and is thus the one favored in the 
literature (e.g., Greene, 2008). 
 Firm-year data for the estimation of equations (1) and (2) are from Compustat for the 
period 1980–2016. We proxy firm output using the log of sales, which reflects how well 
managers maximize revenue. To measure capital, we use the log of the sum of the dollar amount 
of net property, plant, and equipment; net operating leases; net R&D; purchased goodwill; other 
intangible assets; and cost of inventory. To measure labor we use the log of the number of 
employees. The choice of these inputs is justified based on their contributions to the generation 
of sales revenue and the role of managers in determining their level. 
 We estimate equation (1) using Bayesian techniques. We prefer Bayesian over simple 
structural equation modelling for three reasons. First, we have very good priors on explanatory 
13 
 
variables, owing to Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) and their data set. Given that we optimally 
need one or more variables to approximate management practices, the priors help with better 
approximation compared to structural equation modelling. Second, structural equation modelling 
estimated via maximum likelihood usually encounters convergence problems, and our model is 
no exception. The main reason for this is the presence of latent variables in the model, including 
dynamic latent variables. Third, and quite important, subject to good priors, specific Bayesian 
techniques are not overly sensitive when changing the determinants of the latent variable. 
 For estimation, we assume that the vector of inputs contains unity, so that the first 
element of β in equation (1) is a random firm-specific intercept. For latent management practices, 
we assume: 
 𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝑧𝑖𝑡𝛿𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡         (2)  
where the vector z includes lagged values of x, as well as current and lagged values of the price 
of labor in logs (the ratio of total personnel expenses to the total number of full-time equivalent 
employees). 
The assumption on the determinants of m is also directly guided by economics and 
management theory. Specifically, we assume that the use of inputs in optimal quantities and their 
allocation determines the quality of management. We use the previous quarter’s input quantities 
to reduce simultaneity concerns, even though we find no significant differences in the results 
when using contemporaneous quantities. Also, including the price of labor follows the corporate 
governance literature identifying compensation as a positive correlate of ability and human 
capital (e.g., Custódio et al., 2013) and serves as an external instrument. Identification through 
input prices has a long tradition in the production economics literature (e.g., Nevo, 2001). In our 
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case, where we assume the labor market is fairly competitive, the price of labor can be a valid 
instrument (Ackerberg et al., 2006).6 
Using the WMS data from Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) and a simple OLS regression 
of inputs on output in that data set, we choose our priors for inputs β across firms i as follows 
(we drop subscript t for simplicity):7 
 𝛽𝑖 ≡ [𝛽𝑖1, … , 𝛽𝑖𝑁],  i = 1,…,N,        (3) 
with:  
 𝛽𝑖~𝑁𝑘−1(0.51𝑘−1, ℎ𝛽
2 𝛪𝜅−1)        (4) 
so that most of these coefficients are in the (0, 1) interval with 95% prior probability and 𝛪𝜅−1 is 
a vector of ones in ℝ𝑘−1. For the management component, we prefer to be a priori agnostic and 
assume an uninformative prior:8 
 𝛽𝑖𝑚~𝑁𝑘−1(?̅?, ℎ𝛾
2)          (5) 
where ?̅? = 0.8 and ℎ𝛾 = 10
3. For the estimation of equation (2) we have:  
 𝛿𝑖~𝑁dim⁡(𝛿)(𝛿̅𝛪dim⁡(𝑑), ℎ𝛿
2𝛪dim⁡(𝛿))       (6) 
                                                 
6 For the price of labor to be a valid instrument in equation (2), the identification condition is that it is uncorrelated 
with the production function residuals u. For this to hold, we must exclude a number of possibilities. First and 
foremost, the price of labor needs to strongly affect m. Theoretically, this must hold, as a higher price of labor 
should reflect better management practices in a competitive labor market. Empirically, we find that this is indeed the 
case. Second, these prices should not directly affect (enter) the production of firm output. By construction, the 
production function has this property. Third, and related to the first, the labor market needs to be perfectly 
competitive so that each firm separately has no effect on market prices. The size and depth of the markets 
considered should mean that, at least in our data set, this property is satisfied. Fourth, input prices should vary 
sufficiently to allow for good econometric identification. Our labor prices vary by firm-year so that this condition is 
also met. 
7 For the estimation of priors, we use log of sales as firm output and the logs of labor and capital as inputs. We 
choose the same priors for all inputs. This is not a problem, given that we allow variation given the probabilistic 
framework of the Bayesian method. 
8 This also does not play much role in our end estimates of management practices. Using the distributional 
information from Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) to construct more informative priors yields very similar results. 
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where dim denotes the dimension of the corresponding vectors, 𝛿̅ = 0, and ℎ𝛿 = 10
3, so that 
these priors are relatively uninformative. Also, we allow for different treatment of initial 
conditions: 
 𝑚𝑖0~𝑁(0, 10
4)         (7) 
which is practically also diffuse. Thus, we apply here the principle of indifference, which assigns 
equal probabilities to all possibilities for management practices. For the intercept, results in the 
literature are mixed and thus we assume a nearly flat prior: 
 𝛽𝑖~𝑁(0, 10
4)          (8) 
 As is standard practice in the Bayesian literature, we resort to Markov chain Monte Carlo 
(MCMC) methods for inference. MCMC can be implemented using a Gibbs sampler where all 
posterior conditional distributions are in well-known families.9 We run the Gibbs sampler for 
150,000 iterations and burn the first 50,000 to mitigate possible start-up effects. We successfully 
test convergence using Geweke's (1992) diagnostic; autocorrelation in MCMC never exceeds 
approximately 0.40 for any parameter. 
 Using the model described by equations (1) and (2) and the estimation method of 
equations (3) to (8), we obtain a mean value of management practices equal to 1.51 and standard 
deviation equal to 0.299. Also, our measure takes values between 0.421 and 3.101. In table A2 of 
the appendix, we report average estimates of management practices by industry and year. We 
observe a similar level of skill across industries, which is intuitive as there is a priori no reason 
that more skillful individuals are employed in specific industries. The industries with the highest 
average management index values are utilities, telephone/TV, and finance. Nonetheless, the 
                                                 
9 For brevity, these details are available on request. 
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finance industry has some of the lowest scores in some cases. Other industries that score low in 
terms of management practices are durables and chemicals. 
 
2.4. Validation of our management index  
We note that the numerous assumptions made in estimating the latent-variable model, including 
assumptions about the data and variables, priors, and functional forms, are decided based on both 
theory but also on our results’ capacity to approximate the state-of-the art measure of the WMS 
and a Monte Carlo validation method. In the appendix, we report results from these two 
validation procedures to show that what we measure is indeed management and not some other 
unobserved input. 
First, we show that when we apply our model to the data from the WMS, we achieve an 
approximately 90% correlation with the index in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007), which is 
derived from the survey data without any formal estimation of a production relation. In principle, 
this validation approach is an almost ideal natural experiment in which we compare the state-of-
the-art survey-based method to estimate management with our approach and is convincing 
because such high correlations are not easy to obtain. Without condemning previous methods 
using frontier techniques to estimate management practices, the recent literature shows that these 
techniques fail to pass validation using the WMS data (e.g., Delis and Tsionas, 2018).  
Second, to avoid criticism that our method works only within the WMS sample, we 
conduct a Monte Carlo analysis based on 1,000 simulated samples. We generate these samples 
using a production model as in equation (1) but separate the stochastic term into an inefficiency 
component and the remainder disturbance. This implies that the Monte Carlo is more favorable 
to the frontier efficiency models in estimating management compared to our model. We provide 
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the technical details for the Monte Carlo in the Appendix. Our findings show that for reasonably 
large samples such as ours, the rank correlations between the simulated management scores and 
the estimated management scores using our model and the simulated samples are between 85% 
and 92%, depending on whether input prices in the production relation are observed or missing. 
These are very high values and equivalent to those observed under the WMS validation 
procedure. Given the two validation approaches, we can safely assume that our model produces 
very good management estimates. 
 
3. M&A sample, CAR estimation, and summary statistics 
 
We draw M&A data from the Thomson One Banker database for January 1, 1980, to December 
31, 2016. The data-selection process follows the five restrictions imposed by Fuller et al. (2002), 
Masulis et al. (2007), and Golubov et al. (2015). Specifically, (i) the bidder is a U.S. publicly 
listed company, and the target is either a public, private, or subsidiary U.S. company; (ii) the 
acquisition is complete; (iii) the acquirer owns less than 50% of the target prior to the acquisition 
and 100% after; (iv) the transaction is at least 1% of the bidder’s market capitalization 11 days 
prior to the announcement and it exceeds $1 million in value; and (v) multiple deals within the 
same day for the same acquirer are excluded. 
 We end up with 15,261 events. From this sample, we drop observations lacking 
information on the variables needed to estimate management practices and on some of our 
important controls used in the baseline specifications. Our final sample has 8,106 events.10 We 
provide variable definitions and data sources in table 1 and summary statistics in table 2. 
Following Fuller et al. (2002) and Golubov et al. (2015), we carry out our analysis using three 
                                                 
10 When we study synergistic gains the number of observations drops to around 1,050. This is expected because we 
deal with targets that are not listed and thus do not have information in CRSP. 
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samples. The first includes all deals (full sample), the second includes acquirers that completed 
at least five deals within a three-year time window (frequent acquirers), and the third includes 
acquirers who completed at least two deals within a three-year window (occasional acquirers). 
This practice allows us to study persistence in acquirers’ returns and use acquirer fixed effects. 
The sample of frequent acquirers includes 1,319 deals, and the sample of occasional acquirers 
includes 5,487 deals. Nonetheless, as the number of observations drops considerably when we 
study synergistic gains, we use the whole sample without distinguishing between frequent and 
occasional acquirers. 
 As in previous studies, we find anemic gains for acquirers. Based on the summary 
statistics of table 2, the mean CAR is about 1.3% and the median 0.7%. This is not the case for 
target firms, where the mean (median) CARs are 26.1% (22.2%), respectively. For synergies, we 
have a mean of 2.3% and a median of 1.6%.11 
 Using firm fixed effects is very important because it disentangles the time-invariant firm 
characteristics from our time-variant (firm-year) measure of management practices. In our view, 
management practices, as defined in our context, are dynamic through a learning-by-doing 
process and the addition of new managers and executives. In that sense, and unlike previous 
studies, we examine the role of time-varying, firm-specific management practices in M&A 
success.12 Although our focus is on acquirers, we study the role of acquirer management 
practices on the combined firm CARs in a subsequent section. 
 [Please insert tables 1&2 about here]  
                                                 
11 Past studies have also found positive combined returns (e.g., Andrade et al., 2001; Moeller et al., 2004; Bhagat et 
al., 2005; Wang and Xie, 2008). 
12 This comes at the cost of being unable to conduct any meaningful analysis on target firms and their management 
practices. The reason is that, while studying frequent and occasional acquirers, we limit our sample to firms with 
repeated acquisitions and, thus, a reduced sample of M&As. The sample of targets then becomes quite small because 
target firm information in Compustat and CRSP is quite limited (e.g., if the firm is not public there is no information 
in CRSP). Subsequently, when the number of targets decreases, the same happens for synergy calculations, as target 
information from CRSP is needed to measure synergy CARs. 
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 Table A3 in the appendix reports average acquirer CAR (-2, +2) values for the period 
1980–2016 for 12 different industries. The highest values are in the telephone/TV and consumer 
(durables and nondurables) industries. However, some of these industries perform either 
superbly or very poorly around the events, indicating high volatility. 
 Table 3 reports distributional information on the management practices index and three 
different acquirer CARs (three-, five-, and 11-day windows around an M&A). The statistics 
show that the management quality of the lowest 1% is slightly less than 1, but for the top 1% this 
value surpasses 2. This indicates that management practices among top performers are about 
2.14 (2.076/0.970) times better than those among low performers. The range between the 75th 
and 25th quartile is about 0.50 points, which accounts for about one-third of the mean value of 
the management practices index. 
 As expected, there are considerable differences in abnormal returns. For the bottom 1% 
of performers, the returns are negative and span from -28.2% for CAR (-5, +5) to -18.4% for 
CAR (-1, +1). In contrast, the top 1% performers have returns spanning from 25.1% to 35.3%. 
Hence, the average difference in cumulative returns between top and bottom performers is about 
50%. With an average of 8.2%, the interquartile difference ranges from 6.3% (for the three-day 
window) to 10.5% (for the 11-day window). This indicates that for a market capitalization of 
$3,588 million (the mean in our sample), moving from an acquirer in the first quartile to an 
acquirer in the third quartile will result in gains of about $294.2 million. This outcome is in line 
with the findings of Golubov et al. (2015), who argue that acquirers tend to either be very good 
or very bad in mergers and because of this, there is a considerable gap between the top and 
bottom bidders. 
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 Solitary events of firms that appear once in our sample can drive this number—and thus 
drive our results in a specific direction. We therefore show statistics for frequent and occasional 
acquirers. Occasional acquirers tend to have, on average, slightly lower CAR interquartile ranges 
compared to frequent acquirers (8% versus 8.4%). Hence, the mean interquartile value for 
frequent acquirers translates into almost $301.4 million. It is worth noticing that the median 
value of CARs is very low (1.4%). That is, the average acquirer has an anemic positive outcome 
from M&A activities, revealing that acquirers are either extremely good or bad performers 
(similar findings occur in Golubov et al., 2015, and Gompers et al., 2010). 
[Please insert table 3 about here] 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
4.1. Empirical model and results without management 
 
We now turn to explaining the observed valuation effects with our management practices index. 
The regression for the benchmark model is: 
 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝛹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝛺𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜈𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡     (9) 
where 𝛹 and 𝛺 are vectors of firm and deal characteristics, respectively, and 𝜇 and 𝜈 are firm 
and year fixed effects. Definitions for all variables in this model are in table 1, and summary 
statistics are in table 2. 
 For comparative purposes with benchmark empirical studies, we first estimate a CAR (-2, 
+2) model without our management index (e.g., Masulis et al., 2007; Bao and Edmans, 2011; 
Golubov et al., 2012; Harford et al., 2012). In table 4 we report our findings for the full sample, 
as well as for frequent and occasional acquirers. These findings are very similar to those in the 
benchmark studies. Specifically, acquirer size, buying public targets using stock, and Tobin’s q 
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enter with a negative and highly significant coefficient.13 In contrast, relative size, buying private 
targets using stock, and buying subsidiary targets with cash have a positive and significant effect 
on CARs.14 Variables such as relatedness and free cash flow have marginally significant effects 
in the full sample.15 
What is crucial to notice here is the very low explanatory power of the models, with the 
R-squared and adjusted R-squared being 4.5% and 4.3%, respectively, in the full sample. This 
level of explanatory power is highlighted in Moeller et al. (2004), Masulis et al. (2007), Harford 
et al. (2012), and Golubov et al. (2015), among others. 
[Please insert table 4 about here] 
 
4.2. Baseline results with management 
 
We report our baseline results of the effect of management practices on CAR (-2, +2) in table 5. 
In the first three columns we report results without acquirer and year fixed effects, which are 
added in the last three columns. Management practices enters with the expected positive sign 
and it is statistically significant at the 1% level in all specifications. The coefficient estimate for 
the full sample and without (with) fixed effects equals 6.6% (5.1%). The finding in column (1) 
indicates that a one-standard-deviation increase in Management practices (equal to 0.299), 
increases CAR by 0.020 (obtained from 0.299*0.066). Given that the mean CAR in our sample 
                                                 
13 The latter result highlights that Tobin’s q, previously a measure of management quality (e.g., Lang et al. 1989), 
does not properly reflect this quality. 
14 Previous research documents that the payment method for M&As matters. Specifically, Travlos (1987) and Franks 
et al. (1988) find that cumulative abnormal returns are higher when acquirers pay with cash instead of equity. Using 
stock to pay for acquisitions may signal firm internal problems that may lead to a decrease in the acquirer’s value. 
That is, firms could be overvalued and thus sell their stock (see also Myers and Majluf, 1984; Baker and Wurgler, 
2002; Jensen, 2005; Golubov et al., 2016). As far as private/subsidiary targets are concerned, Fuller et al. (2002) 
find higher CARs for firms that acquire targets with stock. 
15 In the main specifications, Relatedness is based on the two-digit SIC codes. As two-digit codes could be quite 
crude in determining whether two firms are related, we replicate this exercise using four digit SIC codes to construct 
an alternative Relatedness indicator. We find no significant change in our main results (see table A5 in the 
Appendix). 
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is 0.014, this increase is more than 100%. Similarly, the coefficient on Management practices in 
column (4) shows that a one-standard-deviation increase in management practices increases 
CAR by 0.015 points. We document equivalently large increases for frequent and occasional 
acquirers. We find that the coefficient is larger for frequent acquirers compared to occasional 
acquirers, indicating that frequent acquirers possess management practices that are crucial for the 
success of M&As. 
[Please insert table 5 about here] 
 To make the importance of our findings more explicit, in table A4 in the appendix, we 
report the standardized (beta) coefficients of table 5. These statistics allow for a direct 
comparison of the relative effects of the explanatory variables of CARs, showing that 
Management practices is the most important variable in explaining a firm’s CAR following 
M&A in the models without fixed effects. In the models with fixed effects, the potency of the 
effect of Management practices on CARs is second only to acquirer size. Thus, it comes as no 
surprise that the adjusted R-squared of the models in table 5 (0.091) substantially increases 
(more than doubles) compared to the one in table 4 (0.043). These results highlight the 
importance of including our management practices index in the CAR model. 
 The role of fixed effects also deserves special mention. The use of fixed effects increases 
the adjusted R-squared by about 3.4 points when using the full sample. Comparing the same 
specifications, the coefficient on Management practices decreases from 0.066 in models without 
fixed effects to 0.0513 in models with fixed effects. This decrease implies a decline from a 0.020 
point increase in CAR to a 0.015 point increase in CAR when increasing Management practices 
by one standard deviation.16 The 0.005 difference is statistically significant at the 1% level 
                                                 
16 Naturally, the models with fixed effects have fewer observations. If we reestimate the models without fixed 
effects for the sample of the models with fixed effects, there is no change in our inference. Notably, the year fixed 
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(obtained from a Hausman test) and indicates that part of Management practices is indeed a firm 
fixed effect. However, three-quarters of the effect of management practices remains, even in 
models with fixed effects. This suggests that the role of management practices differs 
substantially from one acquisition to another. Thus, management practices are dynamic in the 
sense that good management implies adaptation to the unique environment surrounding each 
acquisition. 
  
4.3. Sensitivity to additional control variables 
In this section, we explore the robustness of the effect of management practices once we control 
for a series of variables shown to affect CARs in the literature. Essentially our tests show that our 
management index does not capture the effect of these variables. 
 First, we look into the role of authority within companies, as corporate governance could 
affect shareholder behavior. Gompers et al. (2003) argue for the importance of balance of power 
and use a governance index (G-index) based on anti-takeover provisions to test their hypothesis. 
Lower G-index values indicate relatively democratic firms, while higher values characterize a 
more despotic corporate environment. They find that firms with higher G-index values have 
lower corporate values. Similarly, Bebchuk et al. (2009) construct an entrenchment index (E-
index), which inter alia accounts for mergers and charter amendments; they find that increases in 
this index are associated with decreases in corporate value and abnormal returns.17 
 In table 6 we report results from specifications including the G-index and the E-index. 
We find that both indices enter with insignificant coefficients. In contrast, Management practices 
                                                                                                                                                             
effects do not play any role in the results (they are jointly insignificant) and any change in the results between the 
first three and the latter three columns of table 5 come from the firm fixed effects. 
17 An issue further complicating firm’s governance is directors’ incentives. For example, Bushman et al. (2004), 
document that directors’ incentives increase with firm complexity and differ with earnings timeliness. 
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enters with a positive and highly significant coefficient at the 1% level. The value of the 
coefficient is lower compared to the benchmark model, but this is probably due to the large 
decrease in sample size due to the unavailability of information for newly added indices for a 
number of firms and years. Indeed, using the same observations as in table 6 and our baseline 
specification (column 4 of table 5), the results are equivalent to those reported in table 6. 
[Please insert table 6 about here] 
 Second, management practices might erroneously capture the effect of time-varying 
corporate governance characteristics, such as compensation and experience of the top-
management team.18 We include the relevant variables and report the results in table 7. Again, 
our management index enters with a positive and significant coefficient at the 1% level. Ergo, in 
the sample where all controls are used (column 6) a one-standard-deviation increase in 
Management practices is associated with a 0.011 unit increase in CAR. This effect is 
economically still very large but somewhat smaller than the equivalent in our baseline results. 
However, as in table 6, this is due to the loss in observations and not the inclusion of the 
additional controls. 
 Regarding the governance characteristics, we find that none of these variables 
consistently has a significant effect on CARs across the six specifications. Thus, management 
practices are by far the most significant governance-related factor in the CAR model. 
[Please insert table 7 about here] 
 In the regressions in table 8, we control for several firm-performance variables, such as 
return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), annual stock return, net profit margin, capital 
expenditures as a proportion of assets (CAPX), and industry sales Herfindahl. This could be an 
                                                 
18 The top-management team includes individuals above the vice president level and thus can be considered senior 
executives (Chemmanur and Paeglis, 2005). For relevant empirical studies, see Gabaix and Landier (2008), Tervio 
(2008), Edmans et al. (2009), Custódio et al. (2013). 
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important addition to our baseline specification because our index should strictly capture 
management practices and not the overall performance of firms. 
 We find that the effect of Management practices changes only slightly from the baseline 
specifications of table 5, indicating that our main finding is robust to the inclusion of firm-
performance indicators. In the specification where most controls are included (column 8), a one-
standard-deviation increase in Management practices leads to a 0.015 point increase in CAR 
(exactly the same as our baseline specification). As for the performance-related variables, we 
find that net profit margin is the most important (negative) determinant of M&A success, while 
ROE, annual stock return, and industry sales Herfindahl are marginally statistically significant 
variables. 
 The results regarding net profit margin are somewhat puzzling, however. We expect that 
firms with more cash flow are more capable of creating firm value through M&As. A potential 
answer to this puzzle could be that profitability indices do not necessarily capture firm 
characteristics—including management practices—that are of high importance in value creation 
through M&As. The negative coefficient on industry sales Herfindahl could signal inefficiencies 
that are more pronounced in more concentrated sectors, where firms live the quiet life (Hicks, 
1935). 
[Please insert able 8 about here] 
 A last set of additional control variables that could affect the relation between effective 
management and CARs concerns industry characteristics. Several papers allude to the role of 
industry characteristics in M&A value creation. For example, one strand of literature argues that 
efficiency problems occur more in conglomerates (e.g., Rajan et al., 2000; Scharfstein and Stein, 
2000). Lang and Stulz (1994) show that multisegment firms have lower Tobin’s q values. In the 
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same spirit, Berger and Ofek (1995) argue that conglomerates are worth about 15% less than 
stand-alone firms. On the other hand, conglomerates allocate capital better due to their 
centralized control (e.g., Stein, 1997). Similar arguments are in the literature on the role of 
technology and innovation. 
 We add three controls to examine whether the acquirer and the target (i) belong to the 
same Fama-French industry (Conglomerate), (ii) belong to high-tech industries (TECH), and (iii) 
have high R&D intensity (RD intensity). Given that our aim is to identify industry characteristics 
as variables potentially biasing our estimates on Management practices and not to identify the 
mere effect of industry characteristics, we also saturate the model using Fama-French industry 
fixed effects. 
 We report the results in table 9. If anything, in the last specification (column 7), our 
management practices index enters with a slightly larger coefficient compared to the baseline 
specification. A one-standard-deviation increase in Management practices implies a higher CAR 
(-2, +2) by approximately 0.018 points. As far as the other controls are concerned, the model in 
column (7) indicates that firms with higher R&D intensity tend to have lower CAR values, while 
Conglomerate enters with a negative yet insignificant coefficient. Further, TECH does not seem 
to affect CARs, as the coefficients we obtain are negative yet insignificant. We should note here, 
however, that the large set of fixed effects might oversaturate the model and prevent proper 
identification of the effect of industry characteristics. 
[Please insert table 9 about here] 
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4.4. Sensitivity to the definition of CARs and outliers 
 
To ensure that our results are not driven by the time around the events, we repeat the previous 
models with CARs calculated over three- and 11-day windows. The results are in table 10 and 
are almost identical to those obtained in the baseline models. For example, for frequent acquirers 
and using fixed effects, the coefficient is positive and statistically significant with a value of 
0.0587 for CAR (-1, +1) and 0.0558 for CAR (-5, +5). These values are almost identical to the 
value of 0.0564 reported in table 5. 
[Please insert table 10 about here] 
 Finally, we look into the possibility that outliers drive our results. For this reason, we 
winsorize our variables at the 1% and 99% levels and repeat our analysis. The results in table 11 
remain highly significant, although now the coefficient on Management practices is somewhat 
smaller. For example, for the benchmark model for the frequent acquirers, the coefficient is 
0.0368 (as opposed to 0.0564). We should note, however, that dropping outliers might create 
downward bias on the effect of management practices because we exclude the extraordinary 
performers in terms of management quality.19 
[Please insert table 11 about here] 
4.5. Synergies 
 
Having studied the impact of management practices on acquirers’ CARs, we next look at firm 
synergies. This is important, as previous research found M&As to positively affect the 
cumulative abnormal returns of the combined firm (e.g., Andrade et al., 2001) and firm 
productivity (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001). More recently, Li (2013) suggests that the 
                                                 
19 The respective exclusion of the observations with low Management practices does not seem to play a major role. 
This is because the distribution of Management practices is leptokurtic, implying relatively concentrated scores 
across firms, and negatively skewed (skewed to the right), implying that relatively few firms have very low 
Management practices scores and the mean scores are closer to the maximum value. 
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increase in target’s productivity comes from decreases in capital expenditures and labor 
expenditures, and associated efficiency gains, all of which are incorporated into market 
expectations. These arguments strengthen our insight, whereby the market expects the quality of 
acquirers’ managers to be positively related to the post-M&A productivity and efficiency of the 
new firm and eventually its value. 
 We calculate synergies following Bradley et al. (1988). We construct a value-weighted 
portfolio for the acquirer and the target, with weights based on market capitalizations of the 
acquirer and the target at the sixth trading day before the announcement (also see Wang and Xie, 
2008). As shown in table A6 of the appendix, there is a positive correlation among all cumulative 
abnormal return measures. 
 To quantify the effect of management practices on synergistic gains, we re-run our main 
specifications having as dependent variable the synergistic gains for different time windows.20 
Comparing tables 5 and 12, the results look similar: in table 5 the coefficient on management 
practices is 0.0513 for the whole sample and in table 12 it is 0.0518. The estimates on the 
controls are also very similar.  
[Please insert table 12 about here] 
 We next include governance controls. The coefficients are still positive and relatively 
close to the values of table 6. Nonetheless, we have statistical significance only when the 
dependent variable is synergy CAR (-1, +1). We should stress though, that compared to the 
initial (small) sample, this one has at least three times fewer observations. Thus, the absence of 
statistical significance here is due to lack of statistical power.   
[Please insert table 13 about here] 
                                                 
20 Because our sample is much smaller now, we do not include firm fixed effects. 
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 We also obtain similar findings when we look at the effect of management practices in 
synergistic gains while accounting for industry-specific characteristics (see table A7). The 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, further adding to our main 
insights that management is indeed one of the most important shaping forces of M&A success. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper contributes to the M&A literature in three interrelated ways. First and most important, 
we measure management practices using standard microeconomic and management theory and 
show that our measure is the most significant explanatory variable in empirical models of M&A 
success. Essentially, including management practices doubles the explanatory power of these 
models, with a one-standard-deviation increase in our index doubling CARs around M&A deals.  
Second, we provide a new time- and firm-variant measure of management practices that 
corroborates the broad definition of management theory and aligns with the production 
economics literature. Our analysis shows that the effect of management practices on M&A 
success comes over and above previously used characteristics of the firm and its governance, as 
well as time-invariant acquirer characteristics. Thus, we contend that the effect of management 
practices is indeed time-variant and cannot be solely attributed to experience, previous success, 
or other unobserved time-invariant firm characteristics.  
Third, our analysis brings together three rather distinct literatures in corporate finance, 
management, and production economics. This synthesis, allows the measurement of management 
practices in a way that significantly predicts M&A success. In turn, the synthesis of the 
literatures is a first step toward examining other more specific theories. One such extension 
resides in reexamining the relation between management practices and corporate characteristics 
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such as CEO turnover, board independence, and female participation on the board. Further, our 
analysis provides incentives to reexamine the relation between the quality of managerial 
practices and executive or employee compensation. Finally, our approach to estimating 
management practices via a latent variable model might provide new ideas for modelling notions 
that, by their own nature, are unobserved. These include but are not limited to social corporate 
responsibility, corporate culture, and accounting practices such as earnings management and 
profit-shifting. We leave these ideas as a desideratum for future research. 
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Table 1: Variable definitions and data sources 
Variable Description 
 
Return variables and antitakeover indexes  
CAR (-2, +2) – acquirer 
 
Five-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of acquirer firm’s stock, i.e. in the (-2, +2) 
days surrounding the announcement date. CAR is calculated using the market model and 
the benchmark is the CRSP value weighted index. Model parameters are estimated over (-
300, -91) days before the announcement.  
CAR (-2, +2) – target Five-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of target firm’s stock, i.e. in the (-2, +2) days 
surrounding the announcement date. CAR is calculated using the market model and the 
benchmark is the CRSP value weighted index. Model parameters are estimated over (-
300, -91) days before the announcement 
Synergy CAR (-2, +2) Five-day cumulative abnormal return for both the acquirer and the target for a value-
weighted portfolio. CAR is calculated using the market model and model parameters are 
estimated over (-300, -91) days before the announcement. Acquirer’ and target’s weights 
are based on their market capitalization six trading days before the announcement (see 
Bradley, Desai, and Kim, 1988). 
GIM index The Governance Index of Gompers et al. (2003) that accounts for 24 anti-takeover 
provisions. 
E-Index The entrenchment index based on Bebchuk et al. (2009).  
 
Bidder characteristics 
Management practices Estimates of good management practices obtained from a production function and the 
method of Delis and Tsionas (2018). 
Ln(acquirer size) The natural logarithm of the market value of a firm’s equity 11 days prior to the M&A 
announcement date. The data are in million dollars and are obtained from CRSP. 
Run-up Bidder’s market-adjusted buy-and-hold return for the window (-210, -11) days. Data are 
from CRSP. 
Sigma Standard deviation of a bidder’s market-adjusted daily returns for the time window (-210, 
-11). Data are from CRSP. 
Free cash flow [(Operating income before depreciation - total interest and related expenses - total income 
taxes - capital expenditures)/(close price x common shares outstanding)]. In Compustat 
coding: [(oibdp - xint - txt -capx)/(prcc_c (x) csho)]. 
Tobin’s q The calculation of Tobin’s q in Compustat is: [at + csho (x) prcc_f – ceq]/at. The values 
are taken for the fiscal year prior to the acquisition. 
Leverage (Total debt in current liabilities + long-term debt)/total assets (Compustat: (dlc + dltt)/at]. 
Tech = 1 if both the bidder and the target belong to high tech industries. Based on Loughran 
and Ritter (2004), Faccio and Masulis (2005), Masulis et al. (2007), and Harford et al. 
(2012) tech firms have the following four digit SIC codes: 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578, 3661, 
3663, 3669, 3671, 3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 3678, 3679, 3812, 3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 
3829, 4812, 4813, 4899, 7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 7375, 7378, 7379. 
Tech target = 1 if the target belongs to a high tech industry (as defined above) and = 0 otherwise. 
Conglomerate = 1 if the acquirer and the target are in different Fama-French industries and = 0 
otherwise. 
R&D intensity R&D expenses divided by total assets (Compustat: xrd/ta). 
R&D high = 1 if R&D intensity for a specific firm is above the industry median and = 0 otherwise. 
ROA Earnings before interest and taxes over total assets (Compustat: ebit/at). The values are 
computed in the fiscal year prior to the acquisition. 
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Low_ROA = 1 if the ROA of a firm is lower than the average of the sector and = 0 otherwise. The 
values are computed for the fiscal year prior to the acquisition. 
ROE Net income over total assets (Compustat: ni/at). The values are computed for the fiscal 
year prior to the acquisition. 
Annual stock return A firm’s stock return on a yearly basis. It is calculated using Compustat data in the 
following manner: [(prcc_f(t)/ajex(t) + dvpsx_f(t)/ ajex(t))/(prcc_f(t-1)/ajex_f(t-1))]. See 
also Custódio et al. (2013). 
CAPX Capital expenditures over total assets (Compustat: capx/at). 
Net profit margin Net income over sales (Compustat: ni/sale).  
Industry sales Herfindahl As in Custódio et al. (2013), this Herfindahl index is based on a firm’s sales. The 
computation utilizes Compustat’s SALE variable. Computations are based on the two-
digit SIC industry codes.  
 
Deal characteristics 
Relative size The deal value (from Thomson One Banker) divided by the market value (CRSP) 11 days 
prior to the deal announcement. 
Relatedness = 1 if bidder and target are in the same two-digit SIC code and = 0 otherwise. Data are 
from Thomson One Banker. 
Friendly merger = 1 if the merger is characterized as such in Thomson One Banker and = 0 otherwise. 
Hostile merger Same as above. 
Neutral merger Same as above. 
Public (cash)  = 1 for acquisition of public targets that have been financed with cash and = 0 otherwise. 
Data are from Thomson One Banker. 
Public (stock) = 1 for acquisition of public targets that have been financed with stock and = 0 otherwise. 
Data are from Thomson One Banker. 
Private (cash) = 1 for acquisition of private targets that have been financed with cash and = 0 otherwise. 
Data are from Thomson One Banker. 
Private (stock) = 1 for acquisition of private targets that have been financed with stock and = 0 otherwise. 
Data are from Thomson One Banker. 
Subsidiary (cash) = 1 if acquisition of a subsidiary target that have been finance with cash and = 0 
otherwise. Data are from Thomson One Banker. 
 
CEO and management team characteristics 
Above vice-president The number of people who are in a position above that of a vice-president in the fiscal 
year prior to the M&A announcement (calculation based on Execucomp data). 
Age1  The average age of the individuals who are above the position of the vice-president in the 
fiscal year prior to the announcement date (data from Execucomp). 
Age2 Executive age in the year prior to the announcement date (data from Compustat). 
Cash pay Total current compensation (Execucomp: total_curr). 
Total pay Total pay for the CEO in thousands of dollars (Execucomp: tdc1). 
Equity pay Restricted stock granted + options granted (in thousands of dollars). In Execucomp: 
rstkgrnt + option_awards_blk_value. 
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Table 2: Summary statistics  
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. 
CAR (-2, +2) -- acquirer 0.014 0.008 0.090 -0.663 1.486 8,106 
CAR (-1, +1) -- acquirer 0.013 0.006 0.080 -0.675 1.456 8,106 
CAR (-5, +5) -- acquirer 0.014 0.009 0.116 -0.972 1.603 8,106 
CAR (-2, +2) -- target 0.257 0.217 0.254 -1.124 2.910 1,050 
CAR (-1, +1) -- target 0.248 0.210 0.254  -0.988 3.044 1,050 
CAR (-5, +5) -- target 0.278 0.239 0.259 -0.274 2.677 1,050 
CAR (-2, +2) -- synergy 0.022 0.015 0.081 -0.352 0.458 1,050 
CAR (-1, +1) -- synergy 0.022 0.014 0.077 -0.333 0.450 1,050 
CAR (-5, +5) -- synergy 0.025 0.020 0.097 -0.423 0.459 1,049 
GIM index 9.298 9 2.718 2 17 799 
E-index 2.402 2 1.249 0 6 1,003 
Management practices 1.512 1.513 0.299 0.421 3.101 8,106 
Ln(acquirer size) 6.260 6.238 1.876 0.412 12.978 8,106 
Run-up 0.122 0.099 0.224 -0.994 2.030 8,106 
Sigma 0.030 0.027 0.016 0.007 0.192 8,106 
Free cash flow 0.003 0.033 0.229 -10.977 2.423 8,106 
Tobin's Q 2.164 1.639 2.324 0.258 48.839 8,106 
Leverage 0.219 0.190 0.201 0 1.406 8,106 
TECH 0.219 0 0.413 0 1 8,106 
TECH target 0.272 0 0.445 0 1 8,106 
Conglomerate 0.400 0 0.490 0 1 8,106 
RD intensity 0.061 0.034 0.080 0 1.124 4,842 
ROA 0.085 0.096 0.130 -2.112 0.590 8,106 
ROE 0.034 0.000 0.145 -3.007 0.445 8,106 
Annual stock return 1.363 0.053 8.246 0.004 730.446 7,889 
CAPX_AT 0.065 1.095 0.082 0 1.978 8,102 
Net profit margin -0.074 0.042 3.357 -285.696 6.978 8,100 
Industry sales Herfindahl  0.293 0.050 0.244 0 1 8,106 
Relative size 0.231 0.216 0.523 0.01 23.261 8,106 
Relatedness 0.600 0.090 0.490 0 1 8,106 
Friendly merger 0.994 1 0.074 0 1 8,106 
Hostile merger 0.003 1 0.059 0 1 8,106 
Neutral merger 0.001 0 0.038 0 1 8,106 
Public (paid with cash) 0.054 0 0.225 0 1 8,106 
Public (paid with stocks) 0.046 0 0.210 0 1 8,106 
Private (paid with cash) 0.119 0 0.324 0 1 8,106 
Private (paid with stocks) 0.067 0 0.250 0 1 8,106 
Subsidiary (paid with cash) 0.124 0 0.330 0 1 8,106 
Above vice-president 4.743 5 1.523 1 11 3,721 
Average age (above vice-president) 64.755 64 7.777 32 94 3,513 
Average age (executives) 53.167 53 5.595 35.667 78 3,112 
Cash pay for CEO (in thousand) 1,195.826 858.617 1,899.304 2.535 36,812.51 3,351 
Total pay for CEO (in thousand) 5,178.175 2,866.143 8,625.244 10 140,724.30 3,330 
Equity pay for CEO (in thousand) 2,984.136 909.242 8,540.830 0 140,340.80 2,032 
 
  
Table 3: Percentile statistics  
This table reports distribution characteristics for management practices and acquirer CAR measured over 
different time windows (2 days, 5 days, and 11 days). CAR is calculated based on the market model. We 
report characteristics for the whole sample, for frequent acquirers and for occasional acquirers. Definitions of 
all variables along with their sources are in Table 1. 
Statistics   Management practices CAR (-1, +1) CAR (-2, +2) CAR (-5, +5) 
Panel A: Whole sample 
1st percentile 0.970 -0.184 -0.208 -0.282 
5th percentile 1.049 -0.090 -0.111 -0.155 
10th percentile 1.109 -0.058 -0.074 -0.104 
25th percentile 1.260 -0.021 -0.028 -0.042 
50th percentile (median) 1.513 0.006 0.008 0.009 
75th percentile 1.757 0.042 0.050 0.064 
90th percentile 1.918 0.095 0.109 0.138 
95th percentile 1.974 0.136 0.158 0.197 
99th percentile 2.076 0.251 0.282 0.353 
p75-p25 (interquartile range) 0.496 0.063 0.077 0.105 
Panel B: Frequent acquirers 
1st percentile 0.989 -0.158 -0.197 -0.290 
5th percentile 1.068 -0.089 -0.116 -0.164 
10th percentile 1.117 -0.061 -0.078 -0.109 
25th percentile 1.285 -0.021 -0.028 -0.043 
50th percentile (median) 1.507 0.009 0.008 0.009 
75th percentile 1.757 0.044 0.052 0.063 
90th percentile 1.918 0.097 0.108 0.140 
95th percentile 1.976 0.128 0.159 0.207 
99th percentile 2.085 0.248 0.279 0.344 
p75-p25 (interquartile range) 0.472 0.065 0.081 0.106 
Panel B: Occasional acquirers 
1st percentile 0.976 -0.174 -0.205 -0.274 
5th percentile 1.057 -0.088 -0.108 -0.153 
10th percentile 1.115 -0.057 -0.073 -0.103 
25th percentile 1.262 -0.020 -0.028 -0.040 
50th percentile (median) 1.509 0.006 0.007 0.009 
75th percentile 1.757 0.040 0.049 0.063 
90th percentile 1.918 0.092 0.107 0.133 
95th percentile 1.973 0.132 0.155 0.193 
99th percentile 2.060 0.236 0.266 0.317 
p75-p25 (interquartile range) 0.495 0.061 0.077 0.103 
  
Table 4: Benchmark regressions (without management) 
This table reports OLS results from the estimation of equation (9) without management 
practices. The dependent variable is the bidder’s CAR, based on a two-day event window (-2, 
+2) around the announcement date. The results are for the whole sample, for frequent 
acquirers (acquirers who have completed at least five acquisitions within a three-year event 
window), and for occasional acquirers (acquirers who have completed at least two 
acquisitions within a three-year period). CAR calculation is based on the market model. The t-
statistics are clustered at the firm level (acquirer). Stars ***, **, * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All regressions include a constant 
term. Definitions of all variables along with their sources are in Table 1. 
 
Whole sample Frequent Occasional 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Ln (acquirer size) -0.0045*** -0.0076*** -0.0051*** 
 
(-6.22) (-4.08) (-6.38) 
Run-up -0.0139** -0.0151 -0.0154** 
 
(-2.00) (-1.03) (-2.06) 
Sigma 0.2168 0.0798 0.0235 
 
(1.39) (0.25) (0.18) 
Relative size 0.0180*** 0.0135 0.0138*** 
 
(3.46) (1.34) (2.87) 
Relatedness 0.0042** -0.0056 0.0042* 
 
(2.12) (-1.11) (1.84) 
Friendly merger 0.0117 -0.0399*** 0.0066 
 
(0.47) (-6.92) (0.17) 
Hostile merger 0.0099 -0.0446 -0.0035 
 
(0.35) (-1.59) (-0.08) 
Neutral merger 0.0230 -0.0687*** -0.0073 
 
(0.61) (-7.03) (-0.17) 
Public (cash) 0.0037 0.0009 0.0042 
 
(1.01) (0.08) (0.92) 
Public (stock) -0.0288*** -0.0357*** -0.0307*** 
 
(-5.71) (-3.33) (-5.09) 
Private (cash) 0.0011 0.0057 0.0003 
 
(0.40) (0.78) (0.10) 
Private (stock) 0.0176*** 0.0077 0.0190*** 
 
(3.46) (0.85) (3.23) 
Subsidiary (cash) 0.0104*** -0.0079 0.0073** 
 
(3.48) (-0.91) (2.08) 
Free cash flow 0.0014 0.0125*** 0.0064 
 
(0.26) (3.69) (1.39) 
Tobin’s q -0.0021*** -0.0008 -0.0018*** 
 
(-3.78) (-0.95) (-3.21) 
Leverage 0.0103* 0.0022 0.0023 
 
(1.75) (0.21) (0.36) 
Observations 8,106 1,319 5,487 
R-squared 0.045 0.047 0.039 
Adjusted R-squared 0.043 0.036 0.036 
 
  
Table 5: Benchmark model with management 
This table reports OLS results from the estimation of equation (9) with management practices. The dependent variable is 
the bidder’s CAR, based on a two-day event window (-2, +2) around the announcement date. The results are for the 
whole sample, for frequent acquirers (acquirers who have completed at least five acquisitions within a three-year event 
window), and for occasional acquirers (acquirers who have completed at least two acquisitions within a three-year 
period). CAR calculation is based on the market model. The t-statistics are clustered at the firm level (acquirer). Stars 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The last three specifications 
include firm and year fixed effects. All regressions include a constant term. Definitions of all variables along with their 
sources are in Table 1. 
 
Whole sample Frequent Occasional Whole sample Frequent Occasional 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Management practices 0.0660*** 0.0583*** 0.0542*** 0.0513*** 0.0564*** 0.0490*** 
 
(13.51) (6.48) (12.07) (11.72) (6.11) (9.37) 
Ln (acquirer size) -0.0044*** -0.0072*** -0.0050*** -0.0113*** -0.0230*** -0.0159*** 
 
(-6.28) (-4.05) (-6.48) (-4.69) (-3.99) (-4.80) 
Run-up -0.0137** -0.0106 -0.0151** -0.0113 -0.0073 -0.0073 
 
(-2.06) (-0.79) (-2.09) (-1.39) (-0.42) (-0.76) 
Sigma 0.1939 0.0336 0.0145 0.0348 -0.2746 -0.0463 
 
(1.33) (0.12) (0.11) (0.19) (-0.56) (-0.19) 
Relative size 0.0172*** 0.0100 0.0134*** 0.0147*** 0.0150 0.0092* 
 
(3.48) (1.09) (2.89) (3.06) (1.54) (1.74) 
Relatedness 0.0040** -0.0054 0.0040* 0.0015 -0.0111 0.0011 
 
(2.05) (-1.11) (1.79) (0.57) (-1.51) (0.37) 
Friendly merger 0.0095 -0.0331*** 0.0059 0.0024 -0.0244 0.0156 
 
(0.34) (-5.61) (0.13) (0.07) (-1.50) (0.39) 
Hostile merger 0.0088 -0.0379 -0.0054 -0.0034 -0.0194 0.0123 
 
(0.28) (-1.33) (-0.11) (-0.09) (-0.75) (0.27) 
Neutral merger 0.0206 -0.0476*** -0.0093 0.0043 -0.0650** 0.0157 
 
(0.53) (-4.49) (-0.19) (0.11) (-2.26) (0.33) 
Public (cash) 0.0042 0.0046 0.0052 0.0006 0.0117 0.0063 
 
(1.15) (0.45) (1.13) (0.14) (1.01) (1.19) 
Public (stock) -0.0281*** -0.0370*** -0.0303*** -0.0250*** -0.0419*** -0.0269*** 
 
(-5.70) (-3.58) (-5.11) (-4.04) (-3.48) (-3.69) 
Private (cash) 0.0012 0.0069 0.0004 -0.0009 0.0029 0.0013 
 
(0.44) (0.94) (0.13) (-0.24) (0.33) (0.31) 
Private (stock) 0.0167*** 0.0054 0.0178*** 0.0167*** 0.0002 0.0202*** 
 
(3.37) (0.62) (3.12) (2.63) (0.02) (2.76) 
Subsidiary (cash) 0.0088*** -0.0081 0.0062* 0.0023 -0.0174* 0.0005 
 
(3.03) (-0.95) (1.78) (0.71) (-1.68) (0.11) 
Free cash flow 0.0010 0.0112*** 0.0050 0.0055 0.0088** 0.0066 
 
(0.21) (3.13) (1.09) (1.32) (2.55) (1.37) 
Tobin’s q -0.0020*** -0.0009 -0.0018*** -0.0016* -0.0011 -0.0017* 
 
(-3.73) (-1.01) (-3.07) (-1.72) (-0.70) (-1.68) 
Leverage 0.0105* 0.0036 0.0035 -0.0072 -0.0395 -0.0239 
 
(1.83) (0.34) (0.56) (-0.62) (-1.35) (-1.61) 
Firm FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,106 1,319 5,487 6,922 1,273 5,317 
R-squared 0.093 0.086 0.074 0.347 0.294 0.346 
Adjusted R-squared 0.091 0.074 0.071 0.125 0.101 0.110 
  
Table 6: Controls for governance indices  
This table reports OLS results from the estimation of equation (9) with management practices and additional 
controls for governance indices developed by Gompers et al. (2003) and Bebchuk et al. (2009). The dependent 
variable is the bidder’s CAR, based on a two-day event window (-2, +2) around the announcement date. The 
results are for the whole sample. CAR calculation is based on the market model. The t-statistics are clustered at 
the firm level (acquirer). Stars ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. All regressions include a constant term and firm and year fixed effects. Definitions of all variables 
along with their sources are in Table 1. 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Management practices 0.0469*** 0.0369*** 0.0404*** 
 
(3.54) (3.63) (3.59) 
G-index -0.0040 
 
-0.0032 
 
(-0.79) 
 
(-0.62) 
E-index 
 
0.0121 0.0069 
 
 
(1.49) (0.75) 
Bidder characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Deal characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 542 655 494 
R-squared 0.481 0.482 0.466 
Adjusted R-squared 0.160 0.154 0.127 
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Table 7: Controls for management characteristics 
This table reports OLS results from the estimation of equation (9) with management practices and additional controls for 
management characteristics. The dependent variable is the bidder’s CAR, based on a two-day event window (-2, +2) 
around the announcement date. The results are for the whole sample. CAR calculation is based on the market model. The 
t-statistics are clustered at the firm level (acquirer). Stars ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. The last three specifications include firm and year fixed effects. All regressions include a constant 
term. Definitions of all variables along with their sources are in Table 1. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Management practices 0.0513*** 0.0345*** 0.0347*** 0.0341*** 0.0338*** 0.0362*** 
 
(11.72) (5.94) (5.99) (5.85) (5.82) (4.22) 
Average age (above 
VP)  
-0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0008 
 
(-0.98) (-1.15) (-1.23) (-1.33) (-1.09) 
Average age 
(executives)  
0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0004 
 
(0.82) (0.95) (0.95) (0.99) (0.49) 
# above vice-president 
  
-0.0025 -0.0024 -0.0026* -0.0033 
  
(-1.63) (-1.56) (-1.70) (-1.43) 
Cash pay 
   
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
   
(0.60) (0.33) (1.55) 
Total pay 
    
0.0000 -0.0000 
 
    
(0.87) (-0.84) 
Equity pay 
     
0.0000 
 
     
(1.05) 
Bidder characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Deal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,922 2,733 2,733 2,720 2,701 1,586 
R-squared 0.347 0.359 0.360 0.349 0.350 0.385 
Adjusted R-squared 0.125 0.131 0.131 0.115 0.115 0.117 
 
  
 
Table 8: Controls for firm performance 
This table reports OLS results from the estimation of equation (9) with management practices and additional controls for firm performance in the fiscal year prior to the 
acquisition. The dependent variable is the bidder’s CAR, based on a two-day event window (-2, +2) around the announcement date. The results are for the whole sample. 
CAR calculation is based on the market model. The t-statistics are clustered at the firm level (acquirer). Stars ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. The last three specifications include firm and year fixed effects. All regressions include a constant term. Definitions of all variables along with 
their sources are in Table 1. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Management practices 0.0513*** 0.0513*** 0.0513*** 0.0500*** 0.0513*** 0.0508*** 0.0511*** 0.0495*** 0.0494*** 
 
(11.72) (11.72) (11.71) (11.39) (11.71) (11.67) (11.68) (11.34) (11.31) 
ROA 0.0054       0.0434  
 
(0.22)       (1.46)  
Low ROA  0.0014      0.0054  
 
 (0.43)      (1.37)  
ROE   0.0115      0.0415* 
 
  (0.58)      (1.89) 
Annual stock return    -0.0000    -0.0000 -0.0000* 
 
   (-1.57)    (-1.58) (-1.75) 
CAPX     -0.0084   -0.0099 -0.0085 
 
    (-0.42)   (-0.49) (-0.43) 
Net profit margin      -0.0111**  -0.0124*** -0.0136*** 
 
     (-2.55)  (-2.70) (-2.81) 
Industry sales Herfindahl 
 
     -0.0150** -0.0125* -0.0118* 
 
 
     (-2.26) (-1.94) (-1.82) 
Bidder characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Deal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,922 6,922 6,922 6,735 6,920 6,917 6,922 6,728 6,728 
R-squared 0.347 0.347 0.347 0.348 0.347 0.350 0.347 0.352 0.352 
Adjusted R-squared 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.128 0.125 0.129 0.126 0.133 0.134 
 
  
 
Table 9: Controls for industry characteristics 
This table reports OLS results from the estimation of equation (9) with management practices and additional controls for 
industry characteristics. The dependent variable is the bidder’s CAR, based on a two-day event window (-2, +2) around the 
announcement date. The results are for the whole sample. CAR calculation is based on the market model. The t-statistics are 
clustered at the firm level (acquirer). Stars ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. The last three specifications include firm and year fixed effects. All regressions include a constant term. 
Definitions of all variables along with their sources are in Table 1. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Management practices 0.0514*** 0.0514*** 0.0514*** 0.0514*** 0.0615*** 0.0615*** 0.0612*** 
 
(11.64) (11.64) (11.59) (11.62) (10.22) (10.22) (10.14) 
Conglomerate 
 
-0.0008 
    
-0.0027 
 
 
(-0.19) 
    
(-0.48) 
TECH (target) 
  
-0.0071 
   
-0.0147 
 
  
(-1.21) 
   
(-1.62) 
TECH (both) 
   
-0.0015 
  
0.0094 
 
   
(-0.22) 
  
(0.96) 
RD intensity 
    
-0.0717 
 
-0.0982* 
 
    
(-1.28) 
 
(-1.69) 
RD high 
     
0.0035 0.0083 
 
     
(0.62) (1.42) 
Bidder characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Deal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fama-French FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,917 6,917 6,917 6,917 4,064 4,064 4,064 
R-squared 0.354 0.354 0.354 0.354 0.391 0.390 0.392 
Adjusted R-squared 0.121 0.120 0.121 0.120 0.145 0.144 0.145 
 
  
Table 10: Alternative CARs. 
This table reports OLS results from the estimation of equation (9) with management practices. Instead of 
acquirer’s CAR (-2, +2), we now use CAR (-1, +1) and CAR (-5, +5). Each numbered line corresponds to a 
column in the previous tables. Specifically, lines [1] to [6] of Panel A correspond to columns (1) to (6) of Table 5. 
Lines [7] to [10] correspond to the last column of the Tables 6, 7, 8, and 9 respectively. Similarly, for Panel B. We 
report t-stats (clustered at the acquirer level) in parentheses. Stars ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All regressions include a constant term. Definitions of all variables along 
with their sources are in Table 1. 
  
Coef. t-stat R2 R2-adjusted Obs. 
 
Panel A: CAR (-1, +1) 
[1] Full sample, FE = No 0.0709*** 14.24 0.116 0.115 8,106 
[2] Frequent, FE = No 0.0593*** 7.54 0.111 0.100 1,319 
[3] Occasional, FE = No 0.0587*** 14.34 0.099 0.096 5,487 
[4] Full sample, FE = Yes 0.0548*** 13.79 0.374 0.162 6,922 
[5] Frequent, FE = Yes 0.0587*** 7.53 0.327 0.142 1,273 
[6] Occasional, FE = Yes 0.0524*** 11.23 0.377 0.153 5,317 
[7] Governance  0.0372*** 3.76 0.475 0.143 494 
[8] Management  0.0407*** 5.68 0.424 0.172 1586 
[9] Firm performance  0.0529*** 13.37 0.380 0.171 6728 
[10] Industry characteristics 0.0620*** 11.51 0.418 0.182 4064 
 
Panel B: CAR (-5, +5) 
[11] Full sample, FE = No 0.0624*** 10.94 0.072 0.070 8,106 
[12] Frequent, FE = No 0.0687*** 5.47 0.076 0.064 1,319 
[13] Occasional, FE = No 0.0522*** 9.41 0.058 0.055 5,487 
[14] Full sample, FE = Yes 0.0459*** 8.92 0.353 0.134 6,922 
[15] Frequent, FE = Yes 0.0558*** 4.88 0.346 0.166 1,273 
[16] Occasional, FE = Yes 0.0446*** 7.33 0.367 0.140 5,317 
[17] Governance  0.0376*** 2.75 0.463 0.123 494 
[18] Management  0.0302*** 3.01 0.377 0.106 1586 
[19] Firm performance  0.0434*** 8.45 0.353 0.135 6,728 
[20] Industry characteristics 0.0556*** 7.83 0.388 0.139 4064 
  
Table 11: Winsorized results 
This table reports OLS results from the estimation of equation (9) with management practices. All variables (except 
dummies) have been winsorized at the 1% level at both ends. Each numbered line corresponds to a column in the 
previous tables. Specifically, lines [1] to [6] of Panel A correspond to columns (1) to (6) of Table 5. Lines [7] to [10] 
correspond to the last column of the Tables 6, 7, 8, and 9 respectively. Similarly, for Panel B. We report t-stats 
(clustered at the acquirer level) in parentheses. Stars ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. All regressions include a constant term. Definitions of all variables along with their 
sources are in Table 1. 
  
Coef. t-stat R2 R2-adjusted Obs. 
 
Dependent variable: acquirer CAR (-2, +2) 
[1] MA: Full sample, FE = No 0.0356*** 14.78 0.063 0.061 8,225 
[2] 
MA: Frequent acquirers, FE = 
No 0.0352*** 5.52 0.068 0.056 1,364 
[3] 
MA: Occasional acquirers, FE 
= No 0.0331*** 11.29 0.057 0.055 5,605 
[4] MA: Full sample, FE = Yes 0.0312*** 10.56 0.319 0.091 7,044 
[5] 
MA: Frequent acquirers, FE = 
Yes 0.0368*** 5.16 0.258 0.059 1,320 
[6] 
MA: Occasional acquirers, FE 
= Yes 0.0300*** 8.84 0.323 0.082 5,438 
[7] MA (governance) 0.0417*** 3.83 0.439 0.090 507 
[8] MA (management team) 0.0239*** 4.12 0.349 0.070 1618 
[9] MA (sales and assets) 0.0451*** 10.42 0.347 0.129 6843 
[10] MA (tech and industry) 0.0357*** 9.1 0.364 0.111 4147 
  
Table 12: Benchmark model with management and synergies  
This table reports OLS results from the estimation of equation (9) for the whole sample. The dependent variable is 
synergistic CARs for acquirer and target. These are computed based on the market model with their respective 
weights based on their market capitalizations six days prior to the day of announcement. The t-statistics are clustered 
at the acquirer level. Stars ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. All regressions 
include a constant term. Definitions of all variables along with their sources are in Table 1.  
 
Synergy CAR(-1, +1) Synergy CAR(-2, +2) Synergy CAR(-5, +5) 
Management practices 0.0471*** 0.0496*** 0.0485*** 0.0518*** 0.0452*** 0.0485*** 
 
(5.66) (5.95) (5.52) (5.81) (4.61) (4.85) 
Ln (acquirer size) -0.0062*** -0.0092*** -0.0066*** -0.0094*** -0.0071*** -0.0102*** 
 
(-4.94) (-5.79) (-4.72) (-5.33) (-4.60) (-5.12) 
Run-up -0.0296* -0.0261 -0.0375** -0.0361** -0.0517** -0.0509** 
 
(-1.90) (-1.61) (-2.42) (-2.28) (-2.35) (-2.26) 
Sigma -0.4376 -0.6075* -0.3046 -0.3842 0.0378 -0.1806 
 
(-1.58) (-1.67) (-1.03) (-1.00) (0.11) (-0.43) 
Relative size 0.0157*** 0.0139*** 0.0135*** 0.0115*** 0.0180*** 0.0164*** 
 
(4.70) (5.07) (3.96) (4.17) (6.55) (6.44) 
Relatedness 0.0121*** 0.0099** 0.0125*** 0.0098** 0.0183*** 0.0153*** 
 
(2.84) (2.31) (2.74) (2.15) (3.34) (2.77) 
Friendly merger -0.0205 -0.0104 -0.0114 0.0025 0.0043 0.0079 
 
(-0.45) (-0.31) (-0.20) (0.06) (0.05) (0.09) 
Hostile merger 0.0151 0.0397 0.0256 0.0529 0.0261 0.042 
 
(0.32) (1.12) (0.45) (1.12) (0.29) (0.49) 
Public (cash) 0.0190*** 0.0137** 0.0175*** 0.0117* 0.0203*** 0.0138** 
 
(3.65) (2.36) (3.19) (1.91) (3.27) (2.02) 
Public (stock) -0.0127** -0.0147** -0.0106 -0.0130* -0.0112 -0.0160* 
 
(-2.10) (-2.28) (-1.61) (-1.81) (-1.38) (-1.84) 
Private (cash) 0.0501 0.0425 0.0640*** 0.0569*** 0.1263*** 0.1168*** 
 
(1.57) (1.33) (3.10) (2.68) (9.66) (8.01) 
Private (stock) 0.0876*** 0.0827*** -0.0033 -0.0066 -0.0777*** -0.0729*** 
 
(10.92) (5.45) (-0.39) (-0.42) (-7.78) (-3.70) 
Subsidiary (cash) 0.0339 0.0325 0.0308* 0.0279 0.0239 0.0268 
 
(1.25) (1.04) (1.65) (1.19) (0.67) (0.67) 
Free cash flow 0.0284 0.0165 0.0281* 0.0167 0.0199 0.0052 
 
(1.64) (1.00) (1.73) (1.04) (1.00) (0.24) 
Tobin’s q -0.0055*** -0.0053*** -0.0058*** -0.0058*** -0.0073*** -0.0077*** 
 
(-3.89) (-3.73) (-4.05) (-4.30) (-3.48) (-3.73) 
Leverage 0.0114 0.0046 0.0234 0.0153 0.0172 0.0049 
 
(0.72) (0.30) (1.44) (0.95) (0.94) (0.26) 
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
No. of observations 1050 1050 1050 1050 1049 1049 
No. of acquirers 671 671 671 671 671 671 
Adjusted R-squared 0.211 0.232 0.185 0.204 0.173 0.189 
  
Table 13: Controls for governance and synergies  
This table reports OLS results from the estimation of equation (9) for the whole sample, including controls for governance indices developed by Gompers et al. 
(2003) and Bebchuk et al. (2009). The dependent variable is synergistic CARs for acquirer and target. These are computed based on the market model with their 
respective weights based on their market capitalizations six days prior to the day of announcement. The t-statistics are clustered at the acquirer level. Stars ***, 
**, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. All regressions include a constant term. Definitions of all variables along with their sources 
are in Table 1. 
                                                       Synergy CAR(-1, +1) Synergy CAR(-2, +2) Synergy CAR(-5, +5) 
Management practices                                                        0.0291* 0.0315* 0.0312* 0.0225 0.0212 0.0247 0.0247 0.0216 0.0211 
                                                          (1.90) (1.92) (1.88) (1.39) (1.34) (1.45) (1.18) (1.12) (0.93) 
G-index                                                         -0.0015  -0.0018 -0.0021  -0.004 -0.0026  -0.0004 
                                                          (-0.80)  (-0.61) (-1.11)  (-1.22) (-1.12)  (-0.11) 
E-index                                                          0.0002 0.0009  -0.0013 0.0048  -0.0069 -0.005 
                                                           (0.07) (0.17)  (-0.38) (0.78)  (-1.53) (-0.58) 
Bidder characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Deal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations                                       159 194 148 159 194 148 158 193 147 
No. of acquirers                                              130 164 122 130 164 122 130 164 122 
Adjusted R-squared                                              0.177 0.156 0.168 0.069 0.107 0.067 0.091 0.123 0.058 
  
Appendix 
In this appendix, intended for online use only, we validate the estimation method of management 
practices and include additional sensitivity tests. To justify our approach for the estimation of 
management, we conduct a (i) semi-natural experiment based on data from the WMS and (ii) 
Monte Carlo simulations based on a frontier production efficiency model.  
Subsequently, in table A2, we report average values of the estimated management 
practices index by year and industry. In table A3, we report average CAR values for the (-2, +2) 
window by year and Fama-French industry. In table A4, we report the standardized coefficients 
of the results reported in table 5. In table A5 we re-run our main specifications defining related 
industries as those with the same four-digit SIC code. In table A6, we show the correlations 
between the different measures of cumulative abnormal returns for acquirers, targets, and 
synergies. Finally, in table A7, we look at the performance of our management practices index in 
synergistic gains, while controlling for industry characteristics.     
 
 
  
Validation of our management practices index 
In this section, we show that the latent-variable model we use to estimate management practices 
is robust. We first estimate our model on data from the WMS, which is originated in the research 
by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007; 2010). This is a unique survey data set, aiming at thoroughly 
estimating management practices across several dimensions and explaining productivity 
differences of firms. The nice feature of this data set is that, independently from the derivation of 
the management practices index, it also reports information on basic inputs and output of firms. 
This allows the estimation of our model of equations (1) and (2), given equations (3) to (8). 
Subsequently, we compare our estimates of management practices with the Bloom and Van 
Reenen management scores. 
 We report summary statistics for our management practices index (WMS data) and the 
scores from WMS in Panel A of Table A1. Obviously, the two sets of statistics are closely 
related. The correlation coefficient between the two indices is 0.8951. In Panel B, we report the 
results from a bivariate regression of our management practices index on the WMS index. The 
results show that a one point increase in Management practices increases the equivalent measure 
from the WMS by 0.94 points. The R-squared of the regression equals 0.91. The summary 
statistics, the high correlation coefficient, and the regression results show the close resemblance 
of the two management practices indices. 
 Validation based on the WMS data forms an almost ideal natural experiment. However, it 
could be argued that such high correlations can only be obtained within that sample. To examine 
the out-of-sample performance of our approach, we also conduct a Monte Carlo exercise. We 
setup the Monte Carlo using a frontier model of production inefficiency of the form: 
𝑌 = 𝐹(𝐾, 𝐿) = 𝐾𝛼𝐿𝛽exp⁡(𝑣 − 𝑢),    (A.1) 
55 
 
where Y is firm output and K, L are capital and labor, whose relative prices are 𝑤𝐾, 𝑤𝐿, 
respectively. Further, v is the error term and u is the inefficiency component.  
We prefer a frontier stochastic efficiency model to show that our findings hold within an 
environment unfavorable to our approach (that does not include an inefficiency component) and 
more favorable to the literature estimating management from a frontier approach (e.g., Andreou 
et al., 2016; Bonsall IV et al., 2016; Demerjian et al., 2012). To derive realistic values for the 
exponents in equation (A.1), we actually estimate A.1 using our dataset in section 2 and set α = 
0.623 and β = 0.344.  
 Following the same literature estimating management from frontier efficiency models, 
we assume u = 1-M, where M is management practices with a price 𝑤𝑀. For simplicity, we 
normalize the price of output to unity (this does not affect our results) and generate relative 
prices of inputs as uniform numbers in the interval (0, 1). We generate technical inefficiency as 
𝑢~𝑁+(0, 𝜎𝑢
2), where 𝜎𝑢
2 = 0.3 and 𝑣~𝑁+(0, 𝜎𝑣
2), where 𝜎𝑣
2 = 0.3, so that the signal-to-noise 
ratio is equal to unity. Again, this is assumption comes from the estimation of equations A.1 
using our dataset and a stochastic frontier approach. Then, we generate M from u = 1-M and the 
price of management 𝑤𝑀 = 10𝑀exp(𝜀𝛭), where 𝜀𝛭~𝑁(0, 0,1
2).  
The first-order conditions for profit maximization of the usual inputs are as follows: 
𝐾 = 𝑎𝑌/𝑤𝐾, 𝐿 = 𝛽𝑌/𝑤𝐿.            (A.2) 
For management, the first-order condition is: 
𝐾𝛼𝐿𝛽exp(𝑣 − 𝑢) = 𝑤𝑀.         (A.3)  
Substituting the first-order conditions in the production function, we can generate bank output 
from:  
𝑌 = {(
𝑎
𝑤𝐾
)
𝛼
(
𝛽
𝑤𝐿
)
𝛽
exp(𝑣 − 𝑢)}
1−𝛼
.    (A.4) 
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Then, we generate inputs from equation (A.2), but for realism we allow some measurement error 
and generate inputs from:  
𝐾 = 𝑎𝑌/𝑤𝐾exp(𝜀𝐾), 𝐿 = 𝛽𝑌/𝑤𝐿exp(𝜀𝐿),                  (A.5) 
where the error terms are distributed as 𝑁(0, 𝜎2). Finally, we generate 𝑤𝑀 from equation (A.3).  
 We consider 1,000 replications. In all cases we set the periods to T = 10 but conduct 
different exercises where the number of firms equals 100, 500, and 2,500. We also use different 
specifications, whereby (i) input prices on capital and labor are observed, (ii) the price of labor is 
missing (and thus is also latent), and (iii) the prices of labor and capital are missing. Of course, 
the last specifications introduce larger error. 
  We next estimate all variants using the simulated data and our approach discussed in 
section 2. In the table below, we report rank correlations between the simulated and the 
estimated management scores. For the larger dataset and when prices are observed, the rank 
correlations are as high as 92% and never fall below 85% for reasonably large datasets.  
Rank correlations between simulated and estimated management 
practices 
The table reports rank correlations between simulated management practices from the 
Monte Carlo method described in Section 4.1 and estimated management practices 
from the translog production function and the simulated samples. We report results 
from different sample sizes, where n is the number of cross-sections (banks). The 
number of periods T is fixed to T = 10. 
 All prices observed Missing 𝑤𝐿  Missing 𝑤𝐿  and 𝑤𝐹  
n=1,500 0.85 0.80 0.75  
n=2,000 0.89 0.83 0.79  
n=2,500 0.92 0.88 0.85  
 
  
Table A1. Management practices estimates vs. WMS 
scores 
Panel A reports detailed summary statistics (percentiles and smallest 
value, overall mean, standard deviation, variance, skewness and 
kurtosis) for management practices estimates using our model and 
WMS data and management practices scores from the WMS data. 
Panel B reports the results (coefficient estimates and t--statistics) 
from the regression of our management practices estimates on the 
management practices scores from the WMS data set. Stars *** and 
** denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A 
Management practices estimates using WMS data 
1% 1.34  
  5% 1.88  
  10% 2.15  
  25% 2.65  Mean 3.23 
50% 3.18  Std. Dev. 0.86 
75% 3.74    
90% 4.20  Skewness -0.24 
95% 4.44  Kurtosis 2.66 
99% 5.02    
Scores from WMS data 
1% 1.42    
5% 1.94    
10% 2.22    
25% 2.72  Mean 3.22 
50% 3.28  Std. Dev. 0.75 
75% 3.78  
90% 4.19  Skewness -0.20 
95% 4.39  Kurtosis 2.59 
99% 4.72    
Panel B 
Regression of management practices estimates on WMS scores 
Management 
practices 
 0.942***   
 (133.1)   
Constant  0.210**   
  (2.15)   
R-squared  0.91   
 
     
 
  
Table A2: Average values of the management practices index by year and industry 
This table presents average values of the management practices index for the whole sample by each year for the twelve Fama-French industries. Some of the industries have 
empty cells, because in the process of calculating the management practices index we had missing observations from Compustat. Apart from the average values of the 
management practices index by year and industry, this table presents the number of best and worst outcomes for each industry within the period 1980-2016 based on our 
calculations of the management practices index. Definitions of all variables along with their sources can be found in table 1. 
Year All 
Non- 
durables 
Durables Manufacture 
Oil, gas, 
coal 
Chemicals 
Business 
Equipment 
Telephone, 
TV 
Utilities 
Wholesale, 
retail 
Healthcare, 
drugs 
Finance Other 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
1980 1.407 1.298 
 
1.620 1.158 
 
1.845 1.516 
 
0.939 
   
1981 1.525 1.383 1.584 1.414 1.568 1.325 1.482 1.713 
 
1.598 1.591 
 
1.755 
1982 1.523 1.447 1.657 1.577 1.476 1.580 1.439 1.593 
 
1.533 1.464 
 
1.520 
1983 1.528 1.682 1.604 1.425 1.594 1.544 1.494 1.647 
 
1.511 1.444 
 
1.551 
1984 1.497 1.394 1.486 1.515 1.527 1.216 1.489 1.703 
 
1.515 1.655 
 
1.483 
1985 1.500 1.435 1.384 1.487 1.408 1.614 1.593 1.499 
 
1.508 1.250 1.080 1.607 
1986 1.545 1.564 1.778 1.492 1.213 1.495 1.531 1.606 
 
1.626 1.573 
 
1.514 
1987 1.515 1.401 1.446 1.656 1.517 1.499 1.583 1.695 
 
1.412 1.313 
 
1.307 
1988 1.508 1.523 1.429 1.579 1.513 1.678 1.482 1.570 
 
1.514 1.289 1.863 1.404 
1989 1.516 1.358 1.558 1.509 1.578 1.589 1.495 1.432 
 
1.486 1.605 
 
1.584 
1990 1.550 1.464 1.745 1.594 1.641 1.199 1.502 1.645 
 
1.497 1.496 1.530 1.639 
1991 1.523 1.290 1.674 1.355 1.515 1.574 1.511 1.695 
 
1.548 1.543 1.780 1.569 
1992 1.488 1.342 1.476 1.468 1.389 1.515 1.499 1.498 
 
1.637 1.497 1.166 1.528 
1993 1.507 1.602 1.404 1.500 1.524 1.588 1.498 1.591 1.732 1.429 1.511 1.513 1.519 
1994 1.510 1.241 1.486 1.568 1.642 1.648 1.479 1.538 
 
1.455 1.504 1.713 1.520 
1995 1.509 1.491 1.437 1.513 1.552 1.626 1.490 1.515 
 
1.529 1.537 
 
1.485 
1996 1.510 1.431 1.364 1.507 1.486 1.459 1.507 1.519 1.906 1.622 1.515 
 
1.513 
1997 1.526 1.508 1.558 1.589 1.470 1.600 1.512 1.531 
 
1.518 1.447 1.199 1.543 
1998 1.511 1.513 1.444 1.498 1.597 1.548 1.522 1.411 
 
1.538 1.508 1.335 1.498 
1999 1.518 1.507 1.600 1.450 1.485 1.572 1.506 1.650 1.314 1.473 1.502 
 
1.609 
2000 1.506 1.569 1.552 1.607 1.469 1.385 1.529 1.452 
 
1.364 1.420 1.665 1.444 
2001 1.507 1.452 1.603 1.569 1.381 1.494 1.527 1.475 
 
1.381 1.488 1.941 1.461 
2002 1.516 1.514 1.630 1.519 1.547 1.222 1.473 1.635 
 
1.439 1.582 1.817 1.579 
2003 1.511 1.514 1.362 1.532 1.530 1.927 1.490 1.610 1.372 1.599 1.513 1.506 1.437 
2004 1.542 1.610 1.606 1.553 1.497 1.460 1.519 1.727 
 
1.608 1.506 1.798 1.610 
2005 1.444 1.686 1.246 1.367 1.464 1.585 1.422 1.637 1.812 1.451 1.506 1.486 1.365 
2006 1.516 1.309 1.852 1.452 1.500 1.463 1.519 1.723 
 
1.521 1.581 1.342 1.513 
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2007 1.505 1.442 1.394 1.543 1.475 1.416 1.548 1.400 
 
1.479 1.488 1.697 1.461 
2008 1.501 1.415 1.309 1.511 1.413 1.404 1.482 1.339 
 
1.538 1.574 1.894 1.515 
2009 1.523 1.584 1.328 1.524 1.404 1.614 1.510 1.200 1.483 1.796 1.473 1.759 1.590 
2010 1.530 1.540 1.500 1.544 1.595 1.665 1.466 1.456 1.211 1.703 1.546 1.102 1.546 
2011 1.476 1.605 1.277 1.481 1.593 1.549 1.467 1.350 
 
1.582 1.467 
 
1.453 
2012 1.477 1.459 1.142 1.443 1.428 1.437 1.491 1.611 
 
1.469 1.459 1.038 1.522 
2013 1.505 1.477 1.551 1.505 1.399 1.451 1.475 1.615 
 
1.469 1.572 
 
1.526 
2014 1.538 1.604 1.445 1.543 1.624 1.642 1.475 1.522 1.801 1.481 1.627 1.416 1.557 
2015 1.529 1.496 1.552 1.470 1.456 1.396 1.579 1.623 
 
1.474 1.448 
 
1.626 
2016 1.464 
 
1.212 1.415 
 
1.435 1.600 
  
1.373 1.486 
 
1.438 
Avg. 1.508 1.476 1.491 1.511 1.490 1.512 1.514 1.554 1.579 1.503 1.500 1.529 1.522 
# Best 
 
2 4 0 1 4 2 5 4 3 1 9 2 
# Worst 
 
4 9 1 3 6 1 1 1 2 1 7 1 
  
 
Table A3: Average CAR (-2, +2) by year and Fama-French industry 
Cumulative abnormal return, CAR (-2, +2), is calculated two days around the event date. The calculation is based on the market model. Data regarding mergers and acquisitions, 
M&A, are obtained from the Thomson One Banker database for a period covering 1980 to 2016. The 12 industries are based on the Fama-French classification. 
Year All  
Cons. 
non-
durables 
Cons. 
durables 
Man. 
Oil, gas, 
coal 
Chem. 
Business 
equip. 
Tel./TV Utilities 
Whole. 
and retail 
Health.  
and  
drugs 
Finance Other 
1980 1.28% -0.02% 
 
-0.12% -3.19% -6.71% 26.39% 11.45% 
 
-8.20% 
 
1.23% 
 
1981 -0.90% 2.98% 1.17% -1.25% -0.74% -5.42% -1.16% -1.49% 2.69% -0.26% -1.59% -0.96% -0.64% 
1982 0.18% 1.21% 2.78% 0.47% 0.90% -1.39% 0.48% 0.87% 1.18% 1.08% -3.30% -0.31% 2.09% 
1983 0.27% 1.65% -1.53% 0.14% 1.22% 1.16% -1.33% 0.22% 0.20% 0.01% -2.50% 0.89% 0.40% 
1984 0.30% 1.57% -0.34% 0.69% 1.65% -1.52% 1.49% -1.99% 1.26% 0.65% 5.58% -0.64% -0.17% 
1985 0.55% 0.33% 1.76% 1.54% 0.39% -0.74% 0.53% 2.68% -2.45% -0.44% -0.35% 0.02% 2.04% 
1986 1.03% 1.94% 7.10% 0.08% 3.08% 20.81% -1.33% 1.81% -0.52% 1.57% -1.67% -0.43% 1.59% 
1987 -0.01% 2.04% -0.64% 0.53% -1.17% -0.18% 2.99% 3.60% -2.97% 7.62% 10.47% -2.51% -3.29% 
1988 0.57% -0.98% -0.39% 0.18% 0.15% 1.62% 2.78% 1.80% 2.51% 1.21% 0.99% -0.48% 2.13% 
1989 0.16% 2.12% 0.37% 0.02% 4.36% 2.65% -0.21% 3.03% 1.58% -2.99% -1.40% -0.95% 4.02% 
1990 0.59% 0.48% 3.22% 0.87% 3.38% -1.67% 1.37% -5.85% -0.58% 1.85% -2.66% 0.07% 0.89% 
1991 2.05% 0.24% 5.28% 2.10% 1.06% -1.45% 0.38% 16.53% 13.81% 0.59% 3.32% 1.54% -0.24% 
1992 1.77% 2.61% 4.18% 0.39% 3.98% 3.80% 4.75% 4.40% 9.12% 3.78% 0.21% -0.12% 2.16% 
1993 1.36% -0.35% 0.83% 3.72% 0.69% 0.48% 3.14% 3.43% 1.32% 0.93% 1.99% -0.06% 2.32% 
1994 0.89% -1.71% 1.68% 2.99% 4.92% 5.18% 1.69% -0.88% -3.84% 2.11% 0.34% -0.34% 2.57% 
1995 0.86% 0.18% 1.67% 1.14% 2.05% 1.70% -0.57% 3.32% 1.22% 2.99% 1.79% -0.04% 2.10% 
1996 1.57% 2.02% 3.09% 2.62% 3.41% -0.12% 2.44% 1.71% 0.22% 1.22% 1.24% 0.42% 2.79% 
1997 1.14% 1.90% 1.81% 2.46% 0.71% 4.98% 1.51% 0.01% -0.23% 1.18% -1.10% 0.31% 3.27% 
1998 -0.08% -0.49% 3.40% 1.26% -2.67% -1.60% 0.10% -0.73% 1.65% 1.41% 2.68% -1.08% -0.09% 
1999 1.40% 2.31% 3.58% 2.28% 6.22% 2.71% 2.49% -1.23% -1.08% 2.13% 0.11% -0.08% 1.98% 
2000 -0.17% 0.80% 1.28% 1.13% 0.61% -4.36% -0.92% -1.20% 0.10% 0.87% -1.57% 0.10% -0.07% 
2001 0.71% 0.56% -2.35% 2.20% 0.62% 3.52% 0.23% 2.09% -0.67% 3.11% 1.29% 0.01% 2.44% 
2002 0.47% 1.02% 0.05% 1.29% 1.79% 0.10% 0.76% 3.62% -0.48% 1.88% -0.01% -0.63% 0.63% 
2003 0.96% 3.05% 0.64% 3.28% 0.79% 5.32% 1.42% -3.19% -1.28% 0.33% 1.43% -0.13% 2.43% 
2004 0.50% 2.94% 7.06% 1.24% 0.37% -1.08% -0.44% 4.17% -0.06% 2.18% 1.30% -0.23% 2.36% 
2005 0.62% 2.85% -3.38% 2.35% -0.22% -1.37% 0.59% -0.99% 1.61% 2.62% -0.44% 0.07% 1.93% 
2006 0.65% 2.16% 4.63% 2.25% -3.22% 0.92% 0.61% 2.31% 1.31% 2.36% 1.90% 0.00% 0.71% 
2007 0.63% 0.92% 0.28% 0.98% 2.98% 1.89% 0.03% 0.23% 0.48% 3.19% 1.53% -0.01% 0.13% 
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2008 0.86% 6.67% 0.27% 1.86% 3.59% -3.66% -0.99% -2.22% -0.50% 0.10% 0.13% 0.79% 2.24% 
2009 1.81% 10.53% 2.64% 1.17% 4.91% 7.92% 0.42% 8.22% 0.64% 2.38% 0.11% 2.66% 1.37% 
2010 0.45% -0.78% 2.66% 1.63% -0.31% 0.37% 0.27% -3.10% -1.30% 4.13% 2.74% -0.52% 1.04% 
2011 0.36% 2.31% -1.00% -0.13% 0.64% -1.19% 0.62% 4.34% 0.69% 0.31% 0.79% -0.37% 1.00% 
2012 1.04% 3.74% 0.47% 1.04% 1.29% 5.33% 1.34% -1.70% -0.58% 2.31% -1.59% 0.74% 1.89% 
2013 1.16% 0.53% 1.71% 1.83% -0.16% -0.45% 1.88% 4.78% 1.10% 4.13% 4.52% -0.02% 1.52% 
2014 1.40% 2.28% -0.67% 2.41% -0.64% 1.30% 0.17% -2.04% 0.62% 1.05% 4.98% 0.80% 4.46% 
2015 0.72% 3.06% 0.86% -0.02% -0.39% 3.10% -1.04% 5.54% -2.87% 3.69% 1.66% 0.41% 0.27% 
2016 1.14% -0.83% 8.20% 2.77% 
 
-2.31% 0.69% 
  
4.66% 0.10% -0.13% 4.44% 
Avg. 0.76% 1.67% 1.73% 1.34% 1.20% 1.07% 1.45% 1.77% 0.68% 1.56% 0.92% 0.00% 1.52% 
 
 
  
 
Table A4: Benchmark model with management – Standardized values 
This table reports standardized coefficients from the estimation of equation (9) with management practices. The dependent variable 
is the bidder’s CAR, based on a two-day event window (-2, +2) around the announcement date. The results are for the whole 
sample, for frequent acquirers (acquirers who have completed at least five acquisitions within a three-year event window), and for 
occasional acquirers (acquirers who have completed at least two acquisitions within a three-year period). CAR calculation is based 
on the market model. The t-statistics are clustered at the firm level (acquirer).  Stars ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. The last three specifications include firm and year fixed effects. All regressions include a 
constant term. Definitions of all variables along with their sources are in table 1. 
 
Whole sample Frequent Occasional Whole sample Frequent Occasional 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Management practices 0.2343*** 0.2069*** 0.1923*** 0.1820*** 0.2002*** 0.1740*** 
 
(13.51) (6.48) (12.07) (11.72) (6.11) (9.37) 
Ln (acquirer size) -0.0932*** -0.1536*** -0.1072*** -0.2390*** -0.4887*** -0.3367*** 
 
(-6.28) (-4.05) (-6.48) (-4.69) (-3.99) (-4.80) 
Run-up -0.0353** -0.0273 -0.0390** -0.0291 -0.0189 -0.0189 
 
(-2.06) (-0.79) (-2.09) (-1.39) (-0.42) (-0.76) 
Sigma 0.0381 0.0066 0.0029 0.0069 -0.0540 -0.0091 
 
(1.33) (0.12) (0.11) (0.19) (-0.56) (-0.19) 
Relative size 0.1284*** 0.0747 0.1001*** 0.1095*** 0.1118 0.0688* 
 
(3.48) (1.09) (2.89) (3.06) (1.54) (1.74) 
Relatedness 0.0233** -0.0317 0.0236* 0.0086 -0.0650 0.0066 
 
(2.05) (-1.11) (1.79) (0.57) (-1.51) (0.37) 
Friendly merger 0.0077 -0.0266*** 0.0048 0.0019 -0.0197 0.0126 
 
(0.34) (-5.61) (0.13) (0.07) (-1.50) (0.39) 
Hostile merger 0.0055 -0.0240 -0.0034 -0.0021 -0.0123 0.0078 
 
(0.28) (-1.33) (-0.11) (-0.09) (-0.75) (0.27) 
Neutral merger 0.0091 -0.0210*** -0.0041 0.0019 -0.0287** 0.0069 
 
(0.53) (-4.49) (-0.19) (0.11) (-2.26) (0.33) 
Public (cash) 0.0099 0.0107 0.0123 0.0015 0.0274 0.0149 
 
(1.15) (0.45) (1.13) (0.14) (1.01) (1.19) 
Public (stock) -0.0776*** -0.1024*** -0.0837*** -0.0692*** -0.1158*** -0.0743*** 
 
(-5.70) (-3.58) (-5.11) (-4.04) (-3.48) (-3.69) 
Private (cash) 0.0043 0.0254 0.0014 -0.0031 0.0105 0.0048 
 
(0.44) (0.94) (0.13) (-0.24) (0.33) (0.31) 
Private (stock) 0.0548*** 0.0178 0.0585*** 0.0548*** 0.0007 0.0663*** 
 
(3.37) (0.62) (3.12) (2.63) (0.02) (2.76) 
Subsidiary (cash) 0.0327*** -0.0301 0.0229* 0.0087 -0.0648* 0.0017 
 
(3.03) (-0.95) (1.78) (0.71) (-1.68) (0.11) 
Free cash flow 0.0430 0.4640*** 0.2062 0.2275 0.3628** 0.2746 
 
(0.21) (3.13) (1.09) (1.32) (2.55) (1.37) 
Tobin’s q -0.0913*** -0.0424 -0.0813*** -0.0733* -0.0496 -0.0787* 
 
(-3.73) (-1.01) (-3.07) (-1.72) (-0.70) (-1.68) 
Leverage 0.0273* 0.0094 0.0091 -0.0188 -0.1026 -0.0621 
 
(1.83) (0.34) (0.56) (-0.62) (-1.35) (-1.61) 
Firm FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,106 1,319 5,487 6,922 1,273 5,317 
R-squared 0.093 0.086 0.074 0.347 0.294 0.346 
Adjusted R-squared 0.091 0.074 0.071 0.125 0.101 0.110 
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Table A5: Four-digit relatedness index 
This table reports OLS results for the estimation of equation (9). The dependent variable is the bidder’s CAR, based 
on a two-day event window (-2,+2) around the announcement date. The results are for the whole sample, for 
frequent acquirers (acquirers who have completed at least five acquisitions within a three-year event window), and 
occasional acquirers (acquirers who have completed at least two acquisitions within a three-year period). CAR 
calculation is based on the market model. The t-statistics are clustered at the firm level (acquirer). Stars ***, **, * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The last three specifications include firm 
and year fixed effects. All regressions include a constant term. Definitions of all variables along with their sources 
are in table 1. 
 
Whole sample 
(1) 
Frequent 
(2) 
Occasional 
(3) 
Management practices 0.0515*** 0.0541*** 0.0488*** 
 
(11.45) (5.90) (9.06) 
Ln (acquirer size) -0.0110*** -0.0233*** -0.0157*** 
 
(-4.58) (-3.98) (-4.74) 
Run-up -0.0114 -0.0046 -0.007 
 
(-1.33) (-0.27) (-0.68) 
Sigma 0.0402 -0.3094 -0.0535 
 
(0.22) (-0.63) (-0.22) 
Relative size 0.0142*** 0.0162* 0.0084 
 
(2.96) (1.66) (1.60) 
Relatedness (based on 4 digit SIC codes) 0.0015 -0.0022 0.0039 
 
(0.54) (-0.36) (1.25) 
Friendly merger 0.0015 -0.0263 0.0151 
 
(0.04) (-1.63) (0.38) 
Hostile merger -0.0057 -0.0287 0.0104 
 
(-0.15) (-1.16) (0.24) 
Neutral merger 0.0032 -0.0632** 0.0142 
 
(0.08) (-2.27) (0.30) 
Public (cash) 0.0019 0.0158 0.0076 
 
(0.43) (1.39) (1.43) 
Public (stock) -0.0235*** -0.0402*** -0.0253*** 
 
(-3.79) (-3.33) (-3.50) 
Private (cash) -0.0005 0.0038 0.0016 
 
(-0.14) (0.46) (0.41) 
Private (stock) 0.0170*** 0.0027 0.0204*** 
 
(2.72) (0.21) (2.82) 
Subsidiary (cash) 0.0031 -0.0177* 0.0014 
 
(0.87) (-1.74) (0.33) 
Free cash flow 0.0049 0.0092*** 0.0059 
 
(1.13) (2.71) (1.12) 
Tobin’s q -0.0018* -0.0011 -0.0019* 
 
(-1.91) (-0.71) (-1.86) 
Leverage -0.0065 -0.0327 -0.0224 
 
(-0.57) (-1.11) (-1.53) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 7047 1320 5440 
Adjusted R-squared 0.143 0.098 0.134 
  
Table A6: Correlations matrix for cumulative abnormal returns 
  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 
[1] CAR (-1, +1) acquirer 1 
        
[2] CAR (-2, +2) acquirer 0.877 1 
       
[3] CAR (-5, +5) acquirer 0.683 0.756 1 
      
[4] CAR (-1, +1) target 0.070 0.055 0.049 1 
     
[5] CAR (-2, +2) target 0.067 0.065 0.055 0.975 1 
    
[6] CAR (-5, +5) target 0.058 0.062 0.105 0.917 0.941 1 
   
[7] CAR (-1, +1) synergy 0.774 0.681 0.530 0.334 0.320 0.286 1 
  
[8] CAR (-2, +2) synergy 0.691 0.798 0.609 0.288 0.308 0.279 0.903 1 
 
[9] CAR (-5, +5) synergy 0.544 0.620 0.856 0.226 0.239 0.299 0.718 0.787 1 
 
 
  
Table A7: Controls for industry characteristics in synergy equations 
This table reports OLS results from the estimation of equation (9) using the whole sample and including additional 
controls for industry characteristics. The dependent variable is synergistic CARs for acquirer and target. These are 
computed based on the market model with their respective weights based on their market capitalizations six days 
prior to the day of announcement. The t-statistics are clustered at the acquirer level. Stars ***, **, * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. All regressions include a constant term. Definitions of all 
variables along with their sources are in Table 1. 
                                                          Synergy CAR(-1, +1) Synergy CAR(-2, +2) Synergy CAR(-5, +5) 
Management practices                                                       0.0499*** 0.0500*** 0.0476*** 
                                                          (4.98) (4.61) (4.12) 
Conglomerate                                              -0.0212*** -0.0245*** -0.0392*** 
                                                          (-2.60) (-2.75) (-3.45) 
Tech (target)                                               -0.0083 -0.008 -0.0047 
                                                          (-0.92) (-0.74) (-0.42) 
Tech (both)                                                      -0.001 0.0061 0.0037 
                                                          (-0.11) (0.54) (0.30) 
RD intensity                                              -0.027 -0.0764 0.0149 
                                                          (-0.45) (-1.23) (0.22) 
RD high                                                   -0.0025 0.006 0.0024 
                                                          (-0.34) (0.76) (0.25) 
Bidder characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Deal characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations                                       783 783 782 
No. of acquirers                                              471 471 471 
Adjusted R-squared                                              0.25 0.217 0.203 
 
